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REFRAMING HOUSING: INCORPORATING
PUBLIC LAW PRINCIPLES INTO PRIVATE LAW
KRISTEN BARNES*
A new public-private law paradigm is developing with respect to the
relationship of the state to private contracts. The paradigm melds private
law concepts like unconscionability, good faith, and fair dealing with the
public human rights principles of dignity and vulnerability. I trace this
paradigm shift in the context of the housing law of Spain, where several rich
cultural and legal resources have inspired a new sensibility with regard to
residential mortgage loan contracts, rental agreements, and the overall
duties and obligations of governments to address the citizenry’s housing
needs. Although this reorientation reflects decisions from the European
Court of Justice and from the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, it is equally driven by an organic transformation
in our understanding of housing markets and redistributive justice. Rather
than receive the new paradigm with myopic trepidation, observers should
herald it as the beginning of a much-needed dialogue between the public,
human rights discourse, private business interests, and economic markets.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In some quarters, human shelter is a market good. Access to housing is
determined by contract law and thus allocated on the basis of ability to pay
and individual preferences. As a market good, access to housing is often
limited by such terms as fraud, duress, unconscionability, good faith, and fair
dealing. In other quarters, human shelter is considered a basic foundation of
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human flourishing and capacity and thus comparable to a right. The market
view and the human rights view seem to inhabit two different realms,
maintained by scholars who typically do not dialogue with each other. One
view inhabits the world of private law; the other the realm of distributive
justice.1 Markets allocate housing on the basis of contract; shelter is provided
to the most vulnerable by the state.
In this article, I challenge the dichotomy between markets and rights
and suggest a new synthesis in both language and practice to delineate a
model that is both market and rights-oriented.2 I accomplish this through a
case study of the evolution of approaches to housing markets in Spain. In
particular, a confluence of forces has begun to reshape the public regulation
of private financing and other private order agreements. Although the
process has by no means resulted in a complete integration of private and
public law, it has produced a repositioning on how Spanish courts evaluate
housing contracts and the actions they may take with regard to unfair
contracts. Some of the forces are the widespread disillusionment regarding
financial housing instruments following the global economic crisis of 2008,
the disastrous impact of the terms of existing financial instruments,
widespread domestic protests prompted by human suffering, and the external
forces of the European Union (EU) and international social impacts. The
result is a reorientation toward consumer protection in housing that
integrates concepts of unconscionability, good faith, vulnerability, and
human dignity into the previously private regulation of housing contracts.
I draw several major lessons from my analysis. First, the development
of national policy in a country like Spain results from an iterative process
that reflects the relationship between international human rights law, private
ordering in the central sector of housing, and EU law. Second, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ)3 and the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) have been instrumental in
reshaping how private housing contracts are treated and in articulating a

1. See Alain Supiot, The Public-Private Relation in the Context of Today’s Refeudalization, 11
INT’L J. CONST. L. 129, 129 (2013) (noting the historical distinction between public and private law).
Supiot maintains that it is the “subordination of private to public” that “makes the structure of law
intelligible and dependable.” Id. at 130; see also Hugh Collins, Private Law, Fundamental Rights, and
the Rule of Law, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2018).
2. Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the
Twenty First Century: An Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125 (2013).
3. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUROPA, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en (last visited Sept. 7, 2020). The ECJ is the Court of
Justice for the European Union. Id. Based in Luxembourg, the ECJ “interprets EU law to make sure it is
applied in the same way in all EU countries and settles legal disputes between national governments and
EU institutions.” Id.
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baseline of procedural fairness due to contractual parties.4 Furthermore, they
have influenced the development of a new approach in borrowing,
consolidating, and interpreting concepts across theoretical frames of public
and private law.5 Third, governments within the EU and ESCR treaty orbit
bear significant responsibilities. They must ensure that individuals are
accorded meaningful due process in hearings concerning owned and rented
housing and provide services or resources where the market fails to do so.
Fourth, human rights obligations, as interpreted by the ESCR Committee,
compel governments to satisfy substantive housing needs even when
resources are constrained.
This article is organized as follows: Part I introduces the project. Part II
then examines the centrality of housing in the global economy, the origins of
Spain’s housing crisis, and policies that heavily favored banks, to the
detriment of precarious property owners6 and non-owners. Part III provides
a background on the protests that arose in the midst of Spain’s economic
recession and their contribution to the paradigm shift. Part IV summarizes
germane international and national legal mechanisms that impact the housing
sector and related legal claims. Part V examines rulings of the ECJ and the
ESCR Committee to elucidate how consumer protection applies to mortgage
loan borrowers and renters. I also highlight moments of inter-juridical
dialogue, which have contributed to reframing housing transactions, along
with Spain’s legislative responses. Part VI addresses critiques of private and
public law scholars and interrogates the concepts of unconscionability, good
faith, fairness, vulnerability, and human dignity. Part VII discusses
progressive changes in housing laws and rules that are beneficial to
consumers. Part VIII includes recommendations for constructing equitable
and stable housing markets. Part IX concludes the Article.

4. Admittedly, procedural and substantive fairness are distinct. Nonetheless, procedural fairness
can be a pathway to achieving substantive fairness.
5. The ECJ and the ESCR Committee have different competencies. The ECJ is charged with
interpreting EU law, including the directives and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
The ESCR Committee is authorized to interpret the ESCR treaty.
6. Here, I am drawing upon the concept of the precariat, popularized by Guy Standing. See
generally GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2016). The “precariat” refers
to “[p]eople whose employment and income are insecure, especially when considered as a class.”
Precariat, LEXICO, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/precariat. I am using the term to refer to
individuals who hold the title as the owners of mortgaged real property but whose circumstances with
respect to their lenders, debt load, and, perhaps, fragile employment status, mean that they are in imminent
danger of losing their property through default and foreclosure.
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II. THE HOUSE THAT SPAIN BUILT: FINANCIALIZATION,
REPOSSESSIONS, EVICTIONS, AND GHOST TOWNS
Spain, like other democracies, remains challenged by matters of
housing insecurity and over-indebtedness. To understand the evolving
approach towards housing contracts in private law and public law, it is
necessary to examine the conditions that precipitated Spain’s housing crisis.
Economic devastation remains imprinted on the country’s landscape, despite
economic forecasts of growth and declarations that the nation’s descent into
financial austerity is at an end.7 Unfinished business remains. Therefore, it
is necessary to analyze the housing sector, a primary vehicle through which
the destruction unfolded.
On January 1, 1986, the EU welcomed Spain into the fold.8 Prior to its
acceptance, Spain’s pre-1986 policies laid the foundation for the economic
crisis that emerged in 2008. General Francisco Franco9 anointed housing as
a strategy for national economic development and prosperity in the latter
years of his reign.10 Under Franco’s regime, the nation transformed from a
country of renters into one fixated on homeowners,11 creating approximately
thirty-five million new consumers.12 Privileging homeownership over
affordable rental housing continued as a standard government practice even

7. Peter S. Goodman, Spain’s Long Economic Nightmare is Finally Over, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/business/spain-europe-economy-recovery-unemployment
.html. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development provides the following economic
forecast summary:
After expanding at over 3% in the past three years, the economy is projected to grow
at a robust, but more moderate, pace in 2018 and 2019. Favourable financial conditions
and strong job creation will continue to support private domestic demand. Net exports will
also contribute positively to GDP growth. Inflation will remain moderate as unemployment
remains high.
103 OECD, OECD Economic Outlook 221 (2018).
8. Spain, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/
spain_en (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
9. General Francisco Franco was a dictator who ruled Spain from 1939–1975. STANLEY G. PAYNE
& JESÚS PALACIOS, FRANCO: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2014).
10. José María Cardesín, City, Housing and Welfare in Spain, from the Civil War to Present Times,
43 URB. HIST. 285, 288 (2016) (noting that this period is defined as “desarrollismo” or “policy of
development at all costs”).
11. See Dan Galluppi, Country Case Studies and Links: Spain, EUR. WELFARE ST.,
https://www.pitt.edu/~heinisch/ca_spai.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2020); Melissa García-Lamarca,
Reconfiguring the Public Through Housing Rights Struggles in Spain, in CITY UNSILENCED: URBAN
RESISTANCE AND PUBLIC SPACE IN THE AGE OF SHRINKING DEMOCRACY 45 (Jeffrey Hou & Sabine
Knierbein eds., 2017) (explaining that mfore than fifty percent of Spain’s inhabitants were renters in
1950).
12. Eric Solsten & Sandra W. Meditz, Spain: A Country Study—Population, COUNTRY STUD.,
http://countrystudies.us/spain/34.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (referring to 1975 figures).
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after the transition to parliamentary democracy.13 In the period covering
1950 to 2001, “the percentage of privately owned main homes rose from 46.7
percent to 88 percent whilst the number of rented homes fell from 3.2 million
to 1.6 million.”14 Rather than creating an economy in which all residents
shared in the country’s wealth, this narrow growth policy, combined with
archaic mortgage laws and global economic pressures, ploughed the way for
financial disaster.15 Advancing into the twenty-first century, financialization
proved to be an attractive approach for Spain.16 Financialization refers to a
conceptualization of a system in terms of profiteering and revenue. It
privileges shortsighted wealth accumulation. Typically, only those select
few who are in dominant economic or political positions reap the benefits.
Rather than alleviating inequality, financialization deepens it.17 Unsound
lending practices in Spain flourished under the financialization ethic.18 The
13. See Spain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/spain
(last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
14. Cardesín, supra note 10, at 300. For additional information on changes in homeownership rates,
see JUDITH SUNDERLAND, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED DREAMS: IMPACT OF SPAIN’S HOUSING
CRISIS ON VULNERABLE GROUPS 5 (2014).
15. Cardesín, supra note 10, 300–04.
16. See generally MANUEL B. AALBERS, THE FINANCIALIZATION OF HOUSING (2017) (providing
an extensive discussion on financialization).
17. Mike Collins, Wall Street and the Financialization of the Economy, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2015,
11:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/02/04/wall-street-and-the-financializationof-the-economy/#31224d3f5783; Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters
(Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard College, Working Paper No. 525, 2007), http://www.levyinstitute.org/
pubs/wp_525.pdf. Commenting on Rana Foroohar’s book, MAKERS AND TAKERS, the Wharton School
of Business writes:
Where finance and banking were once the servants of the larger economy, pooling deposits and
directing them to productive investment, they have now become the master. The
‘financialization’ of banking, and of business in general, has hampered real growth and
innovation while exacerbating inequality.
The Pitfalls of the ‘Financialization’ of American Business, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON: FINANCE (June
28, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/pitfalls-financialization-american-business/.
18. JULIA GUMY, CIVIC CONSULTING OF THE CONSUMER POLICY EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, THE
OVER-INDEBTEDNESS OF EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS: UPDATED MAPPING OF THE SITUATION, NATURE
AND CAUSES, EFFECTS AND INITIATIVES FOR ALLEVIATING ITS IMPACT—PART 2: COUNTRY REPORTS
459–61 (2013); Cardesín, supra note 10, at 299 (“Mass access to housing ownership was achieved
through over-indebtedness [in Spain]. National mortgage debt increased twelvefold, and household
indebtedness soared from sixty-two percent of disposable income (1995) to 130% (2008). By the end of
this period, forty percent of privately-owned main homes were mortgaged.”); Vicente Salas & Jesús
Saurina, Deregulation, Market Power and Risk Behavior in Spanish Banks, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 1061,
1061 (2003); Pablo Martín-Aceña, Maria A. Pons, & Concepción Betrán, 150 Years of Financial
Regulation in Spain. What Can We Learn?, 43 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 35, 66 (2014) (describing the removal
of certain regulatory requirements thereby allowing more entrants to the lending industry); BANCO DE
ESPAÑA, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AND BANKING CRISIS IN SPAIN, 2008-2014 30–35 (2017)
(discussing the liberal granting of credit by lenders for residential home purchases and unrealistic
expectations regarding future increases in home value as contributing to the real estate bubble of the Great
Recession).
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lending practices pursued included: overvaluation of residential properties,
extending excessive credit, placing unsuspecting and inadequately protected
individuals on loans as guarantors, sometimes listing them on several
mortgages through a technique known as “crossed” or “chained”
mortgages,19 and targeting undercapitalized and marginalized groups for
residential mortgage loans with unfavorable terms.20
In the pre-2008 global recession years of wishful expansion, Spain
created a permissive environment for banks, promoting economic growth
and homeownership over consumer protection.21 Courts enforced the terms
of private lending contracts dictated by the banking industry; the national
laws offered little relief from harsh residential mortgage contracts.22 Unlike
the United States, all residential mortgage loans in Spain, unless negotiated
to be otherwise, are recourse loans.23 Under a recourse loan, if a homeowner
defaults on the loan, the bank can still hold him personally liable for any
remaining difference between the value of the house and the outstanding loan
amount after foreclosure.24 Personal debt remains after the initial auction
“even after the bank has sold the house for a higher value of the awarding
19. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 3.
20. Fiona Ortiz, Insight: Spain’s Jobless Immigrants Take on Banks over Mortgages, REUTERS
(Mar. 26, 2012, 3:44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-spain-evictions/insight-spains-joblessimmigrants-take-on-banks-over-mortgages-idUKBRE82P0DL20120326;
OBSERVATORIO
&
PLATFORMA DE AFECTODOS POR LA HIPOTECA, HOUSING EMERGENCY IN SPAIN: THE CRISIS OF
FORECLOSURES AND EVICTIONS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 11 (2013).
21. Leslie Crawford, Boomtime Spain Waits for the Bubble to Burst, FIN. TIMES (June 8, 2006, 3:00
PM), http://www.afi.es/EO/ftimes%20080606.pdf.
22. GUMY, supra note 18, at 466 (noting the absence of legal protections for defaulted borrowers
in connection with debt collection); Ciaran Giles, European Court Says Spanish Eviction Laws Illegal,
SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Mar. 14, 2013, 5:02 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-europeancourt-says-spanish-eviction-laws-illegal-2013mar14-story.html; Ilan Brat & Christopher Bjork, Spain
Aims to Ease Foreclosure Laws, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887324073504578113070533092166; Stephanie Bodoni, Spain Too Fast to
Evict in Mortgage Disputes, EU Court Rules, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:44 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-14/spain-too-fast-to-evict-in-mortgage-disputes-eu-courtrules-1-.
23. Art. 1911 C.C. (Spain) (“The debtor is liable for the performance of his obligations with all
present and future authority.”).
24. This outcome is grounded in the “unlimited personal liability” principle. Pablo Gutiérrez de
Cabiedes and Marta Cantero Gamito explained that:
Article 1911 of [the] Civil Code establishes [this rule] as an absolute principle, in a categorical
and solemn way: ‘The debtor is liable for the performance of his obligations with all his assets,
present and future.’ And according to Article 105 of Mortgage Law, enacted in 1946, ‘The
mortgage . . . will not alter the unlimited personal liability of the debtor provided in Article
1911 of the Civil Code.’
Pablo Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Marta Cantero Gamito, Country Report Spain, in CONSUMER DEBT AND
SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPE 67, 74 n.43 (Hans-W. Micklitz & Irina Domurath eds., 2015); Suzanne
Daley, In Spain, Homes Are Taken but Debt Stays, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010), https://
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/world/europe/28spain.html.
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price.”25 Following the foreclosure sale, through which either the lender
repossesses the property or a third party purchases it, if there is a remaining
mortgage debt balance, the lender may obtain a judgment and pursue the
foreclosed borrower for the deficiency amount.26 The borrower may be
subject to wage garnishment to satisfy the debt.27 This practice has left many
defaulted and evicted borrowers in debt without any prospect of repayment.
Further, because residential mortgage debt is not contained within the
purview of Spain’s insolvency law,28 personal bankruptcy does not offer a
viable option.29
Prior to the Great Recession, expensive housing was readily available30
in contrast to the insufficient availability of affordable rental options.31
Rental housing composed a mere eleven percent of Spain’s housing
inventory in 2014.32 People were induced to buy rather than rent, not only
because of low-income rental inventory shortages, but also because of the
comparative costs.33 In the years leading up to the 2008 recession, rental
25. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 74.
26. See Inés Benítez, Spain’s New Eviction Law “Protects Banks,” INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS
AGENCY (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/spains-new-evictions-law-protects-banks
(explaining that under Spanish law, people are required to pay off mortgage, interests, and late fees even
after they have been evicted and their home has been repossessed).
27. Due to the recourse nature of Spain’s residential loans, the real estate does not serve as the only
security for the loan. Borrowers are personally liable for the debt. The personal liability aspect of the loan
means that, with a court order, lenders can pursue a borrower’s other assets, including income. Manuel
Castilla Cubillas, Non-Recourse Mortgages and the Prevention of Housing Bubbles—A Proposal for a
Change in the Default Rule on Mortgage Liability in Spain, 25 HOUSE FIN. INT’L 15, paras. 2.1, 3.5, 17
(2011) (discussing the recourse character of Spain’s residential loans and the personal liability of the
debtor); SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 3, 58, 61.
28. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 83.
29. Id. at 78.
30. From 1997 to 2007, “Spain built more houses than the number of new-builds in France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom combined, and the real estate and construction constituted as much
as forty-three percent of the nation’s GDP.” SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 14 (citation omitted); see
also WILLIAM CHISLETT, A NEW COURSE FOR SPAIN: BEYOND THE CRISIS 118–19 (2016) (discussing
the quick increase and plummet of construction in real estate).
31. See generally Miloon Kothari (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of
the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development—Addendum:
Mission to Spain, 7–9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/16/Add.2 (Feb. 7, 2008) (identifying that Spain has a
constitutional right to adequate housing but that there are factors that negatively impact the right);
Asunción Blanco-Romero et. al., Barcelona, Housing Rent Bubble in a Tourist City. Social Responses
and Local Policies, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 4, 6 (2018).
32. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14; Joris Hoekstra et al., Recent Changes in Spanish Housing
Policies: Subsidized Owner-Occupancy Dwellings as a New Tenure Sector?, 25 J. HOUS. AND THE BUILT
ENVIRON. 125, 125 (2010).
33. It is important to note that housing prices from 2000 to 2008 dramatically increased relative to
income. Hoekstra, et al., supra note 32, at 126, 128–29 (commenting that in certain years preceding the
recession, Spain experienced “a declining interest rate, better and easier access to mortgages, longer
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rates, in some instances, exceeded the initial costs of a mortgage.34 For those
in need of more affordable options or government subsidies, the state and the
market were largely unresponsive.35 Public housing, also known as social
housing, accounted for “two percent of the total housing stock,” according
to 2014 figures.36 Thus, financed ownership was a logical alternative to
relatively high rental rates.37 The government’s emphasis on home sales
imposed significant costs on the quality of life for Spain’s residents.
According to one estimate, 39.4% of workers’ income was allocated towards
paying down housing loans.38 High unemployment rates, topping off at
twenty-five percent, also complicated matters.39 For those inclined to rent,
the transitory nature of employment made it difficult, if not impossible, to
secure rental apartments.
Over-indebtedness, difficulties in managing debt, and unemployment
prompted massive loan defaults.40 Over-indebtedness refers to a condition in
which the cost of debt related to housing, credit cards, food, health expenses,

mortgage terms and an increasing share of households with two wage-earners.”). If one considers the
availability of mortgage loans along with the pricing rate, tax incentives, and opportunity to build equity
as compared to paying rent, purchasing a home for some appeared to be the more attractive option. See
Montserrat Pareja-Eastaway & María Teresa Sánchez-Martínez, Spain, in PRIVATE RENTAL HOUSING:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 89–90 (Tony Crook & Peter Kemp eds., 2014); see also Nayla Fuster et
al., From a Culture of Homeownership to Generation Rent: Housing Discourses of Young Adults in Spain,
22 J. YOUTH STUD. 585, 588 (2019).
34. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 3 (describing how banks marketed mortgages of 100 percent
or more of the cost of property, making it more attractive than renting for high prices).
35. See generally Montserrat Peraja Eastaway & Ignacio San Martín Varo, The Tenure Imbalance
in Spain: The Need for Social Housing Policy, 39 URB. STUD. 283 (2002) (discussing how the rental
sector in Spain evolved into a highly liberalized market that has failed to address the limited availability
of rental housing).
36. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 5.
37. See Kothari, supra note 31, at 10–12 (discussing how families have benefitted from financial
help for housing).
38. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 69.
39. See Daley, supra note 24 (reporting that Spain had the highest unemployment rate in the euro
zone in 2010 while real estate prices simultaneously were dropping); see generally SUNDERLAND, supra
note 14 (explaining the impact of unemployment on renting and mortgages).
40. See Iain Ramsay, Two Cheers for Europe: Austerity, Mortgage Foreclosures and Personal
Insolvency Policy in the EU, in CONSUMER DEBT AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPE, supra note 24, at
189, 215 (exploring EU credit and over-indebtedness regulation); Francisco Carballo-Cruz, Causes and
Consequences of the Spanish Economic Crisis: Why the Recovery is Taken so Long?, 3
PANOECONOMICUS 309, 316 (2011) (discussing the role of the real estate and banking sector in the
Spanish housing crisis); Ozlem Akin et. al., The Real Estate and Credit Bubble: Evidence from Spain, 5
SERIES 223, 226, 239–40 (2014) (identifying both bank agency problems and behavioral motives as
drivers of the housing bubble); see also GUMY, supra note 18, at 458–71 (discussing the level, nature,
and drivers of over-indebtedness in Spain); BANCO DE ESPAÑA, supra note 18, at 85–86, 93 (discussing
the increase in “nonperforming loans” for households from 2008 to 2011).
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and other items, exceeds income and asset levels.41 Because a substantial
portion of the household’s available income is earmarked for paying the debt,
there is no expendable income. While many found themselves in this
situation, it failed to elicit sympathetic responses from banks active in the
Spanish market. Assisted by rigid national mortgage procedural laws and
lender-friendly mortgage contracts, banks aggressively initiated foreclosure
proceedings. From 2007 to 2012, lenders repossessed over 400,000 homes.42
By 2017, in the wreckage of rental and mortgage-based evictions, “nearly
two million Spaniards [could not] afford a decent place to live”43 and,
according to a non-governmental organization’s (“NGO”) 2014 report on
Spain, there were an estimated “40,000 homeless people and [an] additional
1.5 million families living in shelters.”44 Although thousands were unhoused
and destitute during the crisis,45 “3.5 million residences – or 13.7 percent of

41. CIVIC CONSULTING OF THE CONSUMER POLICY EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, THE OVERINDEBTEDNESS OF EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS: UPDATED MAPPING OF THE SITUATION, NATURE AND
CAUSES, EFFECTS AND INITIATIVES FOR ALLEVIATING ITS IMPACT—PART I: SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS 3–
4 (2013); see also GUMY, supra note 18, at 458–71.
42. Judith Sunderland, drawing from statistics furnished by the Bank of Spain, reports:
In May 2013, the Bank of Spain published its own figures for the first time. These data were
updated in January 2014, when the Bank of Spain also provided data on the first half of 2013,
suggesting an increase in repossessions by banks. For 2012, the Bank of Spain reported 39,051
repossessions of primary residences. In the first half of 2013, 28,170 primary residences were
repossessed.
SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 16 (citation omitted).
43. Sam Edwards, Homelessness in Spain Is on the Rise, and Owners Are Getting Rough as They
Try to Get Squatters Out, NEWSWEEK (June 19, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
homeless-spain-squatting-owners-getting-creative-627190.
44. Global Homelessness Statistics, HOMELESS WORLD CUP FOUND., https://
homelessworldcup.org/homelessness-statistics/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020); see Francisco Lirola, A Night
on the Street with Madrid’s Homeless, HUFFPOST (July 27, 2016, 1:11 P.M.),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/madrid-homeless_us_5798c7e6e4b01180b5310c2f (discussing
homelessness in Spain as a growing problem); see also Inés Benítez, The Invisible Reality of Spain’s
Homeless, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/10/theinvisible-reality-of-spains-homeless/ (discussing Spain’s citizens that live in poverty or are homeless).
45. See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, There’s a Lesson in Spain’s Surreal, Unfinished Cities,
HUFFPOST (Feb. 11, 2016, 5:11 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/spain-emptycities_us_56ba6221e4b0b40245c47dff (explaining the abandonment of development projects after the
housing bubble burst); Lauren Frayer, In Spain Entire Villages Are up for Sale—And They Are Going
Cheap, NPR: MARKETS (Aug. 23, 2015, 7:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/08/23/
433228503/in-spain-entire-villages-are-up-for-sale-and-theyre-going-cheap (describing the increase in
abandoned villages); Barry Keith, A Symbol of Spain’s Housing Crisis Finds a Community, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:46 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/08/a-symbol-of-spainshousing-crisis-finds-a-community/536280/ (detailing how in 2008 only twenty percent of apartments
were sold in a housing complex in El Quiñón); Nick Whigham, This Is What it Looks Like When a Credit
Fueled Housing Bubble Bursts, NEWS.COM.AU (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.news.com.au/
technology/environment/natural-wonders/this-is-what-it-looks-like-when-a-credit-fuelled-housingbubble-bursts/news-story/b3b877d3012fbeb35b2a71 64ad2ec548 (discussing the collapse of Spain’s
housing market and the remaining abandoned real estate projects as a result).
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the total housing stock” remained vacant.46 Ghost towns in search of foreign
investors sprang up.47 In the wake of this stark reality, a squatters’ movement
was born— squatters “reclaimed” property that they viewed as having been
illegitimately taken from them by the banks and government.48
The socio-economic devastation pointed to the government’s
misalignment of incentives and public interest goals. Spain needed to
develop comprehensive and effective housing policies. The seriousness of
having the fourth largest economy in the EU enthralled in economic disaster
became evident.49 Spain was long overdue for housing law reforms. The
harsh response from the financial sector and the government set the stage for
change, forged an agenda, and pushed thousands of bodies out onto the street
in protest.50
III. INNOVATIVE ACTIVISM—THE LANGUAGE AND ACTION OF
PROTEST
Renters, squatters, the homeless, and debtors besieged the streets with
entreaties that the state respond to their suffering. “H for Housing,” “Homes
not Hotels,” and “Stop the Displacements” signs filled the space of the urban
commons expressing the drama of Spain’s cataclysm of housing and
homelessness.51 The imaginations of international institutions were stirred to

46. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 14; Cardesín, supra note 10, at 298 (“Spain was the second
country in the EU in terms of the percentage of empty houses and second homes.”).
47. See Frayer, supra note 45.
48. See Edwards, supra note 43.
49. The first decades of this century with respect to the global economy have been characterized
by uncertainty. The fragility of the EU is at the forefront of discussion. Brexit is a major source of anxiety.
Without a coherent blueprint for disentangling the UK from an integrated market and for post-Brexit EU,
there is reason for concern about what the impending divorce portends. This is also a time of reflection
regarding the various nations that comprise the EU and their significance to its survival and economic
welfare. Peter S. Goodman, Preparing for ‘Brexit,’ Britons Face Economic Pinch at Home, N.Y. TIMES
(June 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/business/economy/britain-economy-electionbrexit.html.
50. See generally ADA COLAU & ADRIÀ ALEMANY, MORTGAGED LIVES: FROM THE HOUSING
BUBBLE TO THE RIGHT TO HOUSING (Michelle Teran & Jessica Fuquay trans., 2012) (analyzing the
housing crisis and right to housing movement in Spain). The protests continued in later years in response
to budget restrictions and Spain’s high unemployment rate. Paul Day, Tens of Thousands in Spain Protest
Economic Policy, Corruption, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2013, 3:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usspain-protests/tens-of-thousands-in-spain-protest-economic-policy-corruption-idUSBRE91M0E220130
223.
51. See generally García-Lamarca, supra note 11 (discussing the “H for Housing” group and their
efforts to mobilize for accessible housing); Benítez, supra note 26 (detailing the Platform for Mortgage
Victims movement and its responses to the housing crisis); Holly Ellyatt, Spain Politicians to be Fenced
off from Evictions Protesters, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2013, 1:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/04/
11/spain-politicians-to-be-fenced-off-from-evictions-protesters.html (“Spanish police will erect barriers
around politicians’ residences to shield them from protests over the growing number of home evictions
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respond to a state in crisis.52 Their responses altered the legal landscape of
private contracts in the housing sector. Activists’ appeals were clothed in the
language of human rights and legal rights53 conferred by Spain’s
Constitution, EU laws, and international conventions. The rallying cry,
“dación en pago” (deed in lieu of foreclosure), emerged.54 The protestors’
and to call for changes to mortgage laws.”); Tom Burridge, Spanish Protest Movement Fights Housing
Evictions, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17067246 (discussing
ongoing protests for housing in response to banks repossessing homes); Lauren Frayer, Spaniards Take
to Streets to Block Home Evictions, NPR: EUROPE (Nov. 13, 2012, 1:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2012/11/13/165025717/spaniards-take-to-streets-to-block-home-evictions (discussing the lengths
protestors and people losing their homes will go to keep their homes and have better access to housing);
Gerry Hadden & Marco Werman, After Public Outcry, Spain Reviews Eviction Laws, WORLD (Nov. 12,
2012, 12:50 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-11-12/after-public-outcry-spain-reviews-evictionlaws (discussing the growth of eviction protests throughout cities in Spain that have largely been ignored
by politicians); Spanish Activists Protest at Eviction Laws, DAILYMOTION (July 21, 2011),
https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xk162m.
52. See generally Stephanie Bodoni, Spain Too Fast to Evict in Mortgages Disputes, EU Court
Rules, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:44 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0314/spain-too-fast-to-evict-in-mortgage-disputes-eu-court-rules-1- (explaining that courts must be
allowed to ask for eviction cases to be halted pending a determination on the validity of underlying loan
agreements); Ilan Brat & Christopher Bjork, Spain Aims to Ease Foreclosure Laws, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
11,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324073504578113070533092166
(highlighting how Spain had aimed to ease the penalties from foreclosure laws); Ilan Brat & Gabriele
Steinhauser, EU Court Rules Against Spanish Mortgage Laws, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:19 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324077704578360271750843386 (noting that EU
court rulings have made it more difficult for Spain to ease the burden of foreclosure); Tobias Buck, EU
Court Strikes Down Spain’s Eviction Law, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/
16e37aca-8ca5-11e2-8ee0-00144feabdc0 (detailing how Spanish eviction law improperly precludes the
application of EU law); European Court Rules Against Spanish Eviction Laws, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21789650.
53. Human rights organizations were heavily involved in delineating the issues of the moment and
the root causes of the problems. Their work is interconnected with the activism that emerged in the
unfolding and aftermath of the 2008 recession. Leaders of social movements have been instrumental in
shaping the language of activists’ demands. Ada Colau’s role in the development of PAH connects
activism and legal discourse. Colau was trained as a human rights lawyer. In June 2015, she was elected
as the Mayor of Barcelona. Raphael Minder, Spain’s Local Election Results Reshape Political Landscape,
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/world/europe/spains-local-electionresults-reshape-political-landscape.html; Dan Hancox, Is This the World’s Most Radical Mayor?,
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2016, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/ada-colaubarcelona-most-radical-mayor-in-the-world. In her writings, Colau publicized the plight of embattled
borrowers and the homeless. Notably, she, along with Adrià Alemany, published Mortgaged Lives, which
chronicles the government decisions and other factors leading to Spain’s housing crisis as well as PAH’s
genesis. Colau’s new position symbolizes a crossing of boundaries between the various realms of protest,
public, and private. Her new status grants her a privileged platform from which she can wield power to
realize the fundamental changes in economic policy and housing that she advocated for as a PAH leader.
Another example of the relationship between activism and human rights organizations is the work of
Housing Rights Watch (“HRW”). HRW conducts workshops on housing to inform people of their rights
and provides a venue for brainstorming strategies. See Samara Jones, Editorial, NEWSLETTER (Hous.
Rights Watch, Brussels, Belg.), Oct. 2014, at 1.
54. José Coy, founder of one of the branches of PAH writes, “Even pronouncing dación en pago
without tripping up my tongue was a challenge. These days, it’s difficult to find someone in Spain who
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tactics of resistance illustrate Robert Cover’s point that “an act signifies
something new and powerful when we understand that the act is in reference
to a norm.”55 Spain’s civil procedure laws, as discussed in Part V, were
structured to protect lenders. Spanish courts treated private mortgage and
rental contracts as sacrosanct, even if they inflicted substantial harm on
individuals. Residents, rather than banks, were asked to cover the national
excesses as part of Spain’s compliance with the austerity measures imposed
by the EU56; the government was not transparent regarding its interests in the
housing sector leading to rising land costs, affordable housing shortages,
which in turn resulted in higher housing costs, evictions, and homelessness.57
Activists decried the norms that prioritized corporate and government
interests over social welfare. Gathering in public spaces, filing lawsuits,58
sit-ins in financial institutions,59 physically blocking evictions, mobilizing
bank customers to assemble on bank property to destroy their credit cards
and close their accounts,60 and squatting, were techniques that activists
deployed to vocalize their demands for changes in housing laws and the
doesn’t know what it means, and it has turned into a permanent in the political and social agenda.” José
Coy, Prologue to COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50, at 19, 21.
55. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1983).
56. See Interview by Christopher Alessi with Megan Greene, Senior Fellow at the MossavarRahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard Kennedy School (Sept. 28, 2012),
https://www.cfr.org/interview/spain-doubles-down-austerity (explaining how Spain’s austerity measures
pushed new taxes on individuals); see also Day, supra note 50 (explaining that wide spread protests broke
out in response to the Spanish government’s austerity measures); Raphael Minder, Despite Public
Protests, Spain’s 2013 Budget Plan Includes More Austerity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/business/global/spain-unveils-sweeping-budget-cuts.html
(highlighting the removal of tax breaks for home purchases and an increase in the tax on lottery winnings).
57. Kothari, supra note 31, at 15–17, 27–29; Cardesín, supra note 10, at 300–01; U.N., Econ. &
Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ, Soc. and Cultural Rts., Views Adopted by the Committee Under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with Regard to
Communication No. 5/2015, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/61/D/5/2015 (June 20, 2017) [hereinafter MBD].
58. See e.g., Ceesay Ceesay v. Spain, App. No. 62688/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). This case, known
as the “Bloc Salt case,” involved forty homeless individuals, organized by PAH, who took over an
abandoned building, located in a town called Salt in Catalan Spain. The European Court of Human Rights
decided that the government could not summarily remove the squatters without having created a posteviction plan for housing them. To evict the squatters without providing for a contingency plan would
violate the ECHR, specifically Article 3, which prohibits “inhuman or degrading treatment and
punishment,” and Article 8, which recognizes the right to “respect for privacy and family life.”
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 3, 8, opened for
signature Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR] (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953).
59. See Rafael Carmona & Sonia Olea Ferreras, Feature Interview: Plataforma de Afectados por
la Hipoteca: A New Social Movement for Housing Rights, NEWSLETTER (Hous. Rights Watch, Brussels,
Belg.), Oct. 2014, at 6.
60. See Spain’s ‘Indignados’ Protest Foreclosures by Closing Their Bank Accounts, THE
OBSERVERS (May 15, 2012, 6:12 PM) [hereinafter Spain’s ‘Indignados’] http://observers.france24.com/
en/20120515-spain-indignados-protest-foreclosures-closing-bank-accounts-bankia-madrid-homehousing-crisis-loans-debt (detailing the protests to government inaction over evictions).
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government’s austerity policies. As Cover argues, regarding the
interconnectedness of social protest and norms, “this characteristic of certain
lawbreaking . . . gives rise to special claims of civil disobedience.”61 The
protestors’ engagement with government policies infused their political
action with legitimacy;62 however, political action through protest is at once
productive and confining in that boundaries are imposed on the demands by
pre-existing legal structures and language. Public protests illuminated
Spain’s deficiencies in fulfilling the housing needs of its citizens. They also
drew attention to Spain’s outstanding obligations as an EU Member: the
mandate to comply with the UCT Directive.
Cover’s insight regarding the signifying power of law is illustrated by
both the activists and government. Cover notes that law may function as “a
resource in signification that allows us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert,
mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify.”63 The protestors, in part, drew upon
legal language to articulate their struggle. The government’s action of
drafting legislation to reform mortgage laws worked to validate that struggle.
Validation is an act of conferring dignity. Human dignity moves from
abstraction to embodiment (i.e. the lived experience) when people
experience actions and conditions that do not offend their sensibilities as
human beings and when a level of existential decency becomes the norm.
One manifestation of human dignity occurs when the law provides
individuals with protections from more powerful parties.
Widespread evictions spurred the mobilization of groups such as
“Platform for those Affected by Mortgages” (PAH). After several highly
publicized suicides of debtors,64 PAH and other activists called for
government intervention.65 PAH and “H for Housing” emerged as critical

61. Cover, supra note 55, at 8.
62. For example, squatters maintained that they were homeless because of the government’s failure
to designate sufficient subsidized housing. Melissa García-Lamarca describes PAH’s housing
reclamation project:
Obra Social seizes the social function of housing, ensuring that families engaged with the PAH
who are facing eviction and have exhausted all housing options are not left living in the street,
and pressures the public administration at different levels to guarantee the universal right to
housing. In both collective and individual occupations, the aim is to regularize a family’s
situation by negotiating a social rent with the bank, ideally in the same flat/building.
García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 50.
63. Cover, supra note 55, at 8.
64. Sonya Dowsett, Insight: In Spain, Banks Buck Calls for Mortgage Law Reform, REUTERS (Feb.
26, 2013, 7:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-mortgage-reform/insight-in-spain-banksbuck-calls-for-mortgage-law-reform-idUSBRE91P09Q20130226.
65. See OBSERVATORIO & PLATFORMA DE AFECTODOS POR LA HIPOTECA, supra note 20, at 13–
15.
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voices demanding changes in Spain’s housing laws.66 Barcelona in 2009 was
the site of PAH’s genesis.67 The organization initially trained its attention on
the harmful practices of banks and the inadequacies of Spain’s laws
regarding protection for mortgage consumers.68 As PAH grew in political
influence, it broadened its concerns to other social issues including rental
evictions, the lack of affordable housing, and unemployment.69 PAH is selfdescribed as:
a non-partisan’s citizens movement comprising more than 190 nodes
across the Spanish state . . . tak[ing] action in many forms-from the
emotional to the political; media-facing, legal, public communication and
beyond - to seek changes in the law that respond to the human rights
violations suffered by those affected; and . . . [to] propose solutions that
make the right to housing a reality for everyone.70

Housing organizations, like PAH, remolded individual complaints “into
collective public concerns.”71 They gave expression to the harms that
individuals experienced in their private transactions and delivered those
issues, newly reimagined, to the public in a transformative manner. Rather
than dismissing individual foreclosures and evictions as discrete tête-à-têtes
between borrowers and lenders, or landlords and tenants—which would
remain largely shuttered to the public’s eye—activists characterized the
private actions as national existential threats.72 Recasting the private as
public was essential to persuading the government and lending institutions
to view the problems as national and global concerns, rather than as
individual private transactions.73 Publicizing the private harms served
another function, as well: individuals realized the commonality of their

66. There were important antecedents to these groups, such as the 15-M anti-austerity plaza
occupations of May 2011 and #nolevotes (“don’t vote for them”), whose founder was a Spanish lawyer.
67. García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 45.
68. THE PLATFORM FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY MORTG., THE PAH’S GREEN BOOK: A BASIC GUIDE
TO THE PAH 5 (2016).
69. Carmona & Ferreras, supra note 59, at 6.
70. See THE PLATFORM FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY MORTG., supra note 68.
71. García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 45.
72. See COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50, at 85–89 (explaining how the V de Vivienda
movement’s capacity to connect with public opinion was driven by its “direct, communicative
campaigns” and how the movement blossomed into the PAH ); see also Raquel Castillo Lopez, Protests
Become Way of Life in Spanish Recession, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2013, 9:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/uk-spain-protests/protests-become-way-of-life-in-spanish-recession-idUKBRE90K0JB20130121
(describing Spanish protests to rent payments); Lauren Frayer, Spaniards Protest High Rate of
Foreclosures, Debt, VOICE OF AM. (July 26, 2011, 8:00 PM), voanews.com/Europe/Spaniards-protesthigh-rate-foreclosures-debt (discussing protests in Madrid); Andy Robinson, The Deepening Spanish
Debt Crisis, NATION (July 3, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/deepening-spanish-debtcrisis/ (discussing protests in Andalusia).
73. COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50.
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housing and debt problems, which worked to uplift them psychologically.74
Rather than being resigned to solitary struggle, individuals were empowered
in knowing that they were part of a movement for systemic change.75
Characterizing the private as public also allowed the international
community to draw other connections. Not only do evictions imperil Spain’s
future, they also impact the sustainability of the EU— having fiscally healthy
consumers is relevant to the success of the EU, which benefits from reliable
markets.76
The various government responses to PAH’s litigiousness and activists’
campaigns illustrate the dynamic exchanges between public and private
sectors. PAH’s Citizens Legislative Initiative was a significant campaign
that led to the Government’s adoption of Law 1/2013,77 which reformed
Spain’s mortgage system. Because of gaps and ambiguities, which were
highlighted by activists and clarified by the ECJ, the government revised
Law 1/2013 and crafted new ones.78

74. Id. at 49.
75. Id.
76. The Preamble of the UCT makes express the relationship between the welfare of consumers
within Member States and the EU:
Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to safeguard the
citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are
governed by the laws of Member States other than its own, it is essential to remove unfair terms
from those contracts.
Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, 29 [hereinafter Council Directive 93/13].
77. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 78.
78. While the interaction between the State and public has yielded certain positive outcomes, it is
important to recognize that the government has not always been receptive to activism. In some instances,
when individuals have gathered to peaceably protest the inordinate power of banks and their negative
consumer policies, they have met police action. For example, when some protesters assembled to close
their bank accounts, the police apprehended them, recording their names and other identifying
information, so that fines could later be imposed for engaging in “unauthorized protests.” Spain’s
‘Indignados’, supra note 60; see also COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50, at 21 (noting that the media
and state reacted coldly to initial popular movements for reform). A more aggressive government
response was crystallized in the infamous gag law of 2015, known as The Citizen’s Security Law. Prime
Minister Mariano Rajoy was in power when Spain’s parliament passed the law. Maria Roson, Restoring
Freedom of Expression in Spain: End the ‘Gag Law,’ EDRI (June 27, 2018), https://edri.org/restoringfreedom-of-expression-in-spain-end-the-gag-law/. The new law had the effect of outlawing protests
altogether. The law subjects “protesters [to] . . . a range of punishments, depending on the circumstances.
They include a possible fine of 30,000 euros ($31,800) for protesting in front of the Congress or other
parliament buildings.” Jethro Mullen, Virtual Protest: Demonstrators Challenge New Law with
Holograms, CNN (Apr. 12, 2015, 5:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/12/europe/spain-hologramprotest/index.html/. Not to be deterred, individuals protested by projecting holograms against a house of
the lower parliament. The activists projected themselves in specters of undefeated resistance, daring the
State to arrest them. Id. The text of the law can be accessed here: Disposiciones Generales (B.O.E. 2015,
77) (Spain), http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/leyes_espa/lo_004_2015.pdf.
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IV. STRUCTURING HOUSING CLAIMS THROUGH LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS
Many legal avenues availed themselves for the expression of protesters’
demands. The activists sought equitable treatment in their housing contracts,
flexibility towards late payments, and government responsiveness to their
housing needs, including debt forgiveness and affordable housing.79 As a
prelude to my analysis of the paradigmatic cases, the following provides an
overview of the legal instruments available to litigants for housing claims.80
This sheds light on the structuring of the cases and the legal entities that will
probably private housing transactions.
The cases examined herein are primarily grounded in the UCT
Directive and in the ESCR treaty, rather than Spain’s constitutional right to
housing, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter or Charter),81
or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Nonetheless, it is
important to be cognizant of the alternative resources that support
conceptualizing government social welfare obligations, in relation to
consumer protection and redistribution. While all the aforementioned legal
instruments furnish protections to individuals with respect to housing, the
extent of the protection varies depending upon the adjudicating entity (i.e.
whether they are regional supranational tribunals or international
committees), the ostensible goals and purposes of the legal instruments
invoked, and their judicial interpretations.
A. Protections at the National Level: The Spanish Constitution
Spain’s right to housing is enshrined in Article 47 of the national
constitution. Article 47 declares the government’s responsibility to provide
services and protect its citizenry from socio-economic harms. Although its
scope remains unclear, the right sets out what the state must provide to its
populace in declaring that, “[a]ll Spaniards are entitled to enjoy decent and

79. OBSERVATORIO & PLATFORMA DE AFECTODOS POR LA HIPOTECA, supra note 20, at 13–15.
80. For a summary of relevant legal instruments for European housing claims, see FEANTSA,
HOUSING-RELATED BINDING OBLIGATIONS ON STATES FROM EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL CASE
LAW 1–16 (2016).
81. Sánchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao and Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU are notable exceptions.
There, the applicants relied upon the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Directive. However,
their reference to the Charter was based upon the guarantee in Article 47 of an effective remedy, as
opposed to the right to housing in Article 34.3 or the right to “private and family life, home, and
communications” contained in Article 7. See cases cited infra note 97 and note 200. Kušinova v. Smart
Capital a.s. also resorts to the EU Charter. See case cited infra note 268. Like Sánchez Morcillo and
Naranjo, Kušinova does not invoke the article on housing, but rather draws upon Article 38, which
ensures a certain degree of consumer protection. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, art. 38, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 403 [hereinafter EU Charter].
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adequate housing.”82 It imposes governmental obligations to fulfill the right
by requiring, “public authorities” to “promote the necessary conditions
and . . . establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective,
regulating land use in accordance with the general interest in order to prevent
speculation.”83 The constitutional right incorporates a pledge that the
“community shall participate in the benefits accruing from the urban policies
of the public bodies.”84 It affirms the government’s obligation to remain
mindful of its duties to the public in administering housing and other matters
and in designing land use planning and policies. At the time the cases
discussed herein were decided, Spain’s constitutional court had not
interpreted Article 47 as covering residential mortgages and remedies for
defaulted borrowers. According to Housing Rights Watch: “It is precisely
because of the lack of powerful tools in domestic law to adequately protect
the right to housing, that lawyers have been forced to use the existing judicial
instruments and tools at [the] European and international level[s].”85
B. Protections at the Transnational European Level
1. UCT Directive and Private Contracts
For EU mortgage consumers,86 the UCT Directive is the logical
instrument to remedy their claims regarding unfairness in mortgage loan
contracts, predation, and procedurally biased processes weighted in favor of
lenders.87 In part, plaintiffs’ counsel was inspired to bring the cases discussed
herein because Spain’s government had yet to fully incorporate the UCT
Directive into the legal fabric of domestic law, despite the Directive having
been in effect since 1993.88 The UCT Directive is aimed at a variety of
private contracts, including debt instruments.89 With some exceptions, it

82. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. State of Housing Rights in Spain, E-NEWSLETTER (Hous. Rights Watch, Brussels, Belg.), Apr.
11, 2018.
86. Note that the term “mortgage consumers” is intended to include borrowers and guarantors.
87. A recent addition to the consumer protection framework that has a direct bearing on the conduct
of lenders is the EU Mortgage Credit Directive (sometimes “MCD”) which became effective in 2016.
Council Directive 2014/17/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 60) 34 [hereinafter Council Directive 2014/17/EU]. To
ensure the implementation of MCD’s reforms, the European Commission threatened to bring Spain, and
several other countries, before the ECJ. See ACN, Brussels to Take Spain to Court if It Fails “to Enact
Rules on Mortgage Credit,” CATALAN NEWS (Nov. 17, 2016, 6:23 PM), https://www.catalannews.com/
politics/item/brussels-to-take-spain-to-court-if-it-fails-to-enact-eu-rules-on-mortgage-credit.
88. Coy, supra note 54.
89. Council Commission Notice: Guidance on the Interpretation and Application of Council
Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 2019 O.J. (C 323) 5–10 [hereinafter
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covers consumers, sellers, and suppliers operating within the EU orbit.90 A
primary rationale informing the Directive is that the removal of unfair
contract terms facilitates well-functioning markets.91 The Directive insists
on a uniform baseline level of treatment for parties in the negotiation and
enforcement of debt transactions and other consumer contracts.92 It
accomplishes this in several ways: articulating conditions under which
unfairness arises; focusing attention on whether the consumer is impacted
negatively as a sign that unfairness exists; offering exemplars of unfairness;
and furnishing a sample list of unfair terms.93
The nomenclature, “consumer citizen,”94 is of particular significance in
the parlance of EU legislation.95 Here, the consumer citizen is a citizen of the
EU, of a nation state, and of the global market. The Directive defines
“consumer” as “any natural person who, in contracts covered by . . . [the
UCT Directive], is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business,
or profession.”96 The Directive and the ECJ’s jurisprudence are mechanisms
for intervening in private law transactions and undoing contracts in the name
of consumer protection. Both recognize that, “the consumer is in a weak
position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards to both his bargaining
power and his level of knowledge.”97 Focusing on the well-being of
consumers opens the door for reimagining rules which ultimately serves the
redistributive goal of protecting the vulnerable. This reframing also serves
efficiency goals in that the costs of protection are spread throughout the
market rather than placed disproportionately on those least able to shoulder
them.
Council Commission Notice 93/13/EEC] (listing some of the varied contracts to which the UCT Directive
pertains).
90. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76 (holding that Spain, as a member of the EU, is subject
to the Directive).
91. Council Commission Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 5.
92. Id.
93. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76.
94. Michelle Everson & Christian Joerges, Consumer Citizen in Postnational Constellations? 10
(EUI Working Paper Law No. 200647, 2006) (theorizing about consumer interaction with law in the
moment of post-nationalism by examining a WTO Report on genetically modified organisms).
95. The Preamble to the UCT Directive states:
Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to safeguard the
citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are
governed by the laws of Member States, other than his own, it is essential to remove unfair
terms from those contracts.
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, pmbl. (emphasis added). The Preamble further speaks in terms
of “[c]ommunity citizens as consumers.” Id.
96. Id. at 29–30, art. 2(b).
97. Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 2014
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 22 (July 17, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=155118&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18291823.

BARNES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

110

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/19/2021 6:34 AM

[Vol 31:91

In contrast to the emergent political and economic conditions preparing
the way for new national housing policies, the legislative and judicial
pathways were less well-defined. Although the European Union adopted the
UCT Directive as early as 1993, the ECJ had yet to weigh in on its meaning
for housing contracts. Numerous Member States, like Spain, were slow in
fully implementing the EU legislation within their national legal
frameworks, even as late as 2013, the date of the Aziz decision. Also, there
were lingering questions about how best to address the homeless and other
populations in need of additional governmental support, such as immigrants
without established supportive familial networks. The cases analyzed in the
following section illustrate how rules for mortgage and housing markets
emerged out of governmental interactions with international institutions such
as the ECJ and the ESCR Committee. I further claim that public activism
instigated and informed the cases. The multiplicity of discursive regimes
means the individual, who is more than a consumer citizen,98 can bring
several claims.
2. European Union Charter
The EU Charter offers another avenue to bring housing claims. The
Charter pertains to EU Member States and institutions.99 It expressly
articulates human rights laws and ideals,100 although it is influenced by the
ECHR.101 Article 34.3 of the EU Charter states: “the Union recognises and
respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent
existence for all those who lack sufficient resources.”102 The Charter contains

98. The term “consumer” has a duality to it. On the one hand it underscores the fundamental
significance of individuals as purchasers within a global economy. On the other hand, the term is limiting
in that it empties out the humanity of individuals and defines them in terms of specific narrow roles that
are played out in economic markets: accumulator and exchanges of currency.
99. The EU Charter “draws on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the European
Social Charter and other human rights conventions, the constitutional conventions common to EU
Member States, and the [ECJ]’s case law.” FRANCESCA FERRARO & JÉSUS CARMONA, FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF THE CHARTER AFTER THE LISBON TREATY 3 (2015).
100. Note that EU Members are also obligated to adhere to the ECHR. However, the interpretation
of the Convention is within the competency of the ECtHR, not that of the ECJ. The ECJ is authorized to
interpret and apply the Charter. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the
Charter was recognized by EU Member States as having legally binding effect.
101. FERRARO & CARMONA, supra note 99.
102. The full text of Article 34 paragraph 3 states:
In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to
social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient
resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and
practices.
EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 34. Other EU-grounded international legal instruments relevant to housing
rights include: The Treaty of the EU, Anti-discrimination Legislation, and the EU Agency for
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other rights related to housing: the right to “respect for private and family
life, home and communications”;103 the consumer protection right;104 the
protection of family life;105 and the right to access of services of general
economic interest.106
While the Charter incorporates a right to housing, the right, as
formulated, does not clearly state that it pertains to mortgage loan contracts
or that its scope is broad enough to provide relief to overindebted defaulted
borrowers. However, if the right is to be meaningful and effective, one
should be able to rely upon the language, the “right to social and housing
assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient
resources,” to make the case that it encompasses: access to affordable
properties for rent and purchase; government protection from predatory
loans and predatory landlords; relief from procedurally unfair foreclosures
and evictions; the procurement of reasonably priced mortgages with clearly
disclosed terms; opportunities to modify housing contracts when necessary;
and the ability to be released from the terms of a mortgage upon the return
of the collateral.
Whether the ECJ will interpret the Charter to include the interests of
overindebted or defaulted borrowers remains unresolved. There is some
basis for extending that protection if the Court looks to Article 38, which
requires that “Union policies . . . ensure a high level of consumer
protection.”107 It is also unclear how the ECJ will analyze claims grounded
in the Charter in conjunction with (or apart from) those grounded in the UCT
Directive. In other words, whether new cases in which the ECJ expressly
engages with Charter-based rights to housing claims will contribute to the
new public-private housing law framework, or whether the Court’s rulings
will focus solely on the human rights obligations of governments, essentially
preserving a separation between private and public law matters. Regardless,
it is important to recognize that interpreting the Charter is within the
competency of the ECJ and there will likely be future cases in which the
Court has opportunities to further bridge the realm of private residential
housing contracts with public social justice concerns that are, in part,
encapsulated by the right to housing. It is probable that, in terms of influence
within the EU, the Charter may serve as a more formidable connector to the

Fundamental Rights. See EU Housing Rights, HOUSING RIGHTS WATCH, (Oct. 10, 2013), http://
www.housingrightswatch.org/page/eu-housing-rights.
103. EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 7.
104. Id. art. 38.
105. Id. art. 33.
106. Id. art. 36.
107. Id. art. 38.
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private law realm than the rulings of the ESCR Committee.108 This is because
the Charter “enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy, thanks to its ratification
by all Member States on behalf of their citizens[.] . . . [T]he EU Charter can
be described as the outcome of a pan-European political consensus which
should frame both the activity of the EU legislature and EU judges.”109
3. European Court of Human Rights
While the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has addressed
matters concerning human rights related to housing,110 and has a broader
constituency,111 its case law is not the focus of this study for several reasons.
First, there is no express right to housing in the Convention. Instead,
complainants may draw upon a cluster of rights that the Court has interpreted
as affording some protection to individuals with respect to housing in cases
alleging that human rights have been compromised due to forced evictions
or a government’s failure to furnish public housing.112 Notably, Article 8
108. From the standpoint of having a direct effect on government action, Spain is unlikely to view
the UNESCR Committee as carrying the same degree of weight as the ECJ. Nonetheless, the purpose of
including the international committee cases in this analysis is to underscore the contribution the
Committee makes to the conversation regarding the appropriate scope of housing protections. There is an
ongoing dialogue concerning the public/private divide and the proper regulatory frame for dealing with
banks, governments, landlords, etc. Infractions of international human rights norms always carry with
them the threat of reputational harm. In terms of compliance, Spain is more likely to comply with ECJ
decisions because of the EU’s enforcement mechanisms and because publicity concerning its failure to
adhere may be construed as a rejection of its EU obligations.
109. FERRARO & CARMONA, supra note 99, at 10.
110. See Tchokontio Happi v. France, App. No. 65829/12 Eur. Ct H. R. (2015), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-153911 (holding that France was in violation of the Convention in that it
had failed to comply with a final judgment of the Paris Administrative Court and ordering that the
applicant be re-housed in satisfactory accommodations, as required by the national law known as DALO).
The Court specifically noted that France could not circumvent compliance by way of “a State
authority . . . cit[ing] the lack of funds or other resources as an excuse for not honoring, for instance, a
judgment debt.” Id. at 12. The ECtHR held that France’s procrastination was a violation of Article 6 §1
(right to a fair trial) of the Convention. Id. The Happi decision is notably different from South Africa’s
landmark case, Government of The Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
(S. Afr.). If adopted, under the Happi framework, South Africa could arguably be required to redistribute
land to achieve substantive equality. See also V.M. v. Belgium, App. No. 61025/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-169047 (concerning whether degrading living conditions led to the
death of applicant’s daughter); Winterstein v. France, App. No. 27013/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-162215 (finding a violation of Article 8). The ECtHR has made clear
in cases such as Moldavan v. Romania that the quality of housing matters. Press Release, Registrar of
Eur. Ct. H.R., Chamber Judgment Moldovan and Others v. Romania No. 2 (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-1393399-1454825.
111. The ECtHR is responsible for interpreting the Convention for the Council of Europe’s fortyseven members. See 47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47members-states (last updated Sept. 3, 2020).
112. See, e.g., F.J.M v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 76202/16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188124 (discussing the application of Article 8). See also Council of
Europe Housing Rights, HOUSING RTS. WATCH, http://www.housingrightswatch.org/page/council-
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recognizes, “[e]veryone has a right to respect for private life, his home and
his correspondence.”113 Second, ECtHR cases operate under a different
framework.114 The ECtHR has not developed jurisprudence expressly
contemplating how mortgage loan debt instruments intersect with housing
rights.115 While cases grounded in Convention rights involving private loan
or rental contracts could be configured, the current ECtHR housing
jurisprudence is substantively different. Notwithstanding these differences,
the ECtHR will become a more visible part of the new paradigm because of
the size of its membership and influence.116 As the ECJ continues to expand
its jurisprudence on the UCT Directive—incorporating reasoning informed
by human rights ideals—it is likely to consider decisions of the ECtHR in
interpreting the right to housing. The legal instruments that the ECJ will be
ruling on, however, will be the UCT Directive and the Charter.
C. Protections at the International Level: ICESCR
The international human right to housing, enshrined in Article 11(1) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), and further addressed in General Comments 4 and 7, recognizes
that individuals are entitled to housing as essential to their basic dignity.117
Spain, as a ratifying member of the treaty since 1977, is obligated to
incorporate the right within its domestic legal system to meet its international
obligations.118 Spain’s consent to the Optional Protocol means that it

europe-housing-rights (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (“The right to housing is enshrined in numerous
concrete legal norms . . . right to life, prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, right to a
fair trial, right to respect for private and family life, right to an effective remedy, prohibition of
discrimination, protection of property.”); EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., GUIDE ON
ARTICLE 8: RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE (2020)
(explaining Article 8 and analyzing its case law).
113. ECHR, supra note 58, art. 8.
114. The limited number of ECtHR decisions addressing housing do not concern the realm of
financial debt instruments. Both are central to my analysis. The extension of the conceptualization of
public protections into the private, by way of private contracts of debt or leasing, and the importation of
private law concepts into the public sphere, are primary subjects of this Article.
115. It is also not clear that the right to housing helps the homeless in that it may be interpreted to
protect only those who are property owners or tenants. See Council of Europe Housing Rights, supra note
112 (explaining that the right to housing is not explicitly provided for in the ECHR, but rather enshrined
in legal norms).
116. See European Social Charter (Revised), paras. 16–17, 30, 31, May 3, 1996, E.T.S. No. 163
(detailing the rights of family and children, the right to social protections, and enshrining the right to
housing).
117. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
118. Spain initially signed the treaty on September 28, 1976. It then ratified it on April 27, 1977. 3.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
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acknowledges the competence of the ESCR Committee to hear individual
claims grounded in treaty rights.119 Individuals have prevailed upon the
Committee to resolve housing rights matters. As the analysis in the following
section demonstrates, the Committee’s rulings are crucial to the conceptual
move towards incorporating public law principles into private arrangements.
V. HOUSING CONTRACTS THROUGH THE LENSES OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LAW
A. The ECJ and Consumer Protection in Private Housing
Mapping the relevant terrain of private and public law is necessary to
my analysis: examining the specific judicial and legislative action that
constitutes the reframing, intervening in the scholarly debates on the
necessity of public and private law boundaries, and highlighting the new
approach to housing markets. With respect to the first objective, the ECJ
decisions and those of the UN ESCR Committee are essential resources not
only for identifying the dominant private and public law concepts at play but
also for providing contextual examples to give insight to the interfusion.
1. Aziz: Beginning to Reframe Private Housing
Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya120 is essential to the
jurisprudential reframing of private housing transactions in Europe. The ECJ
ruled that some of Spain’s procedural rules regarding mortgage contracts
conflicted with the UCT Directive’s goal of protecting consumers.121 Where
consumers seek a ruling challenging the fairness of their contractual terms,
courts hearing such challenges must be able “to grant interim relief,
including, in particular, the staying of those enforcement proceedings, where
the grant of such relief is necessary to guarantee the full effectiveness of
[their] final decision[s].”122 Rather than providing a definitive statement on
the characteristics of an unfair term or ruling on whether the terms of the
contract in Aziz were unfair, the ECJ offered guidance on evaluating a term’s

COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&
clang=_en (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
119. On May 5, 2013, the Protocol entered into force and Spain acceded on September 23, 2010. 3.a
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-3-a&chapter=4 (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
120. Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415 (Mar. 14,
2013).
121. Id. ¶ 59.
122. Id. ¶¶ 59, 64.
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unfairness.123 The case marks a judicial moment of reflection on the status
of mortgage consumers in relation to lenders and the relationship of both
parties to domestic procedural laws governing their contractual enforcement
rights. Aziz ventures into new territory.124 The ECJ, a supranational court,
conceptualized a complex set of rights that pertain to housing from the
starting place of private contractual terms in mortgage loan agreements. The
decision has ramifications for how interactions between borrowers and
lenders are structured and for the obligations it imposes on states to devise
fair procedural rules regarding the treatment of residential loan debtors and
creditors.
Mr. Mohamed Aziz initiated his case in commercial court (i.e. the
Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 3 de Barcelona) to undo Caixa Bank’s mortgage
enforcement proceedings against him and to protest the bank’s repossession
of his home.125 He took out a loan with Caixa Bank for the principal amount
of EUR 138,000.126 His 33-year loan term ran from August 1, 2007 to July
31, 2040.127 Aziz initially made payments in compliance with his monthly
mortgage obligation,128 but then missed several installments.129 In response,
Caixa, acting under the authority of the loan terms, accelerated his loan130
and sought repossession which was granted by a court charged with hearing
mortgage enforcement proceedings, known as the Court of First Instance and
Instruction No. 5 Martorell.131 At the Juzgado de lo Mercantil, Mr. Aziz
raised questions about the fairness of his mortgage contract. When the
commercial court sought guidance in the form of a preliminary ruling132
123. Id. ¶¶ 65–66.
124. See Irina Domurath & Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in CONSUMER DEBT AND SOCIAL
EXCLUSION IN EUROPE, supra note 24, at 3, 4–5 (highlighting the issuance of the Aziz decision as a
watershed moment).
125. Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=129481&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mod
e=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18301774. The enforcement case was initially brought before the
Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 5 de Martorell. Id. para. 23.
126. Id. para. 12.
127. Id. para 13.
128. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 23.
129. Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, para. 18.
130. Id. para. 19. Acceleration refers to the lender’s power to demand that the borrower pay off the
entire outstanding loan balance upon the borrower’s failure to fulfill certain obligations under the loan
agreement.
131. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL. 62011CJ0415, ¶ 26.
132. As the Court of Justice for the European Union explains in its recommendations to national
courts:
The reference for a preliminary ruling . . . is a fundamental mechanism of EU law. It is designed
to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of that law within the European Union, by
offering the courts and tribunals of the Member States a means of bringing before the Court of
Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) for a preliminary ruling questions concerning the
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concerning the interpretation of the directive, the case made its way to the
First Chamber of the ECJ.133 Additionally, the national court prevailed upon
the ECJ to assess whether Spain’s civil procedural rules, which precluded
debtors from raising fairness arguments regarding their mortgage loan terms,
contravened the directive134 and whether certain terms and provisions of Mr.
Aziz’s contract would be invalidated in light of the ECJ’s interpretation.135
a. Background
Spanish civil procedure laws severely restrict parties in the arguments
and defenses they may assert in an enforcement proceeding.136 Within the
contracted time frame of the proceeding, Mr. Aziz was limited to several
arguments. He could argue that the debt sought had previously been paid and
retired.137 He could assert that the creditor had miscalculated the amount due
on the “closing balance” of the account between the two parties.138 Last, he
could maintain that there was another debt with priority over the one being
foreclosed.139 Omitted from the options was an opportunity for Mr. Aziz to
challenge the fairness of his mortgage loan’s contractual terms.140 The
avenue available for borrowers to initiate this type of challenge at the time
was instead through a civil proceeding.141 That approach was unsatisfactory
because if Mr. Aziz disputed the contract in the civil venue, the court would
interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies of the Union.
Court of Justice of the European Union, Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals in Relation
to the Initiation of Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, para. 1, 2012 O.J. (C 338) 1, 1. A preliminary ruling
by the ICJ is “binding both on the referring court and on all courts in EU countries.” Preliminary Ruling
Proceedings—Recommendations to National Courts: Summary of Recommendations to National Courts
on the Use of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), EUR-LEX (Oct. 31, 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14552.
133. The first stage of the transnational legal process typically involves the issuance of an opinion
by an Advocate General (AG). EUR. PARLIAMENT, ROLE OF ADVOCATES GENERAL AT THE CJEU 4–5
(2019). An AG is a member of the ECJ. Id. at 1. The AG’s opinion typically includes: an introduction to
the case, relevant laws and legal context, statement of facts, the reason that the national court is seeking
a preliminary ruling, and the AG’s well-considered judgment regarding how the matters raised should be
resolved. Id. at 4–5. Although the ECJ judges are not bound by the AG’s opinion, they often influence
the ECJ’s decisions. Id. at 1.
134. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 31(1), 32.
135. Id. ¶ 32.
136. Id. ¶ 54 (referencing L.E. Civ., art. 695 (Spain)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶¶ 14, 54.
140. Id. ¶ 54.
141. L.E. Civ. art. 698(1) (Spain); Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700,
para. 25 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=129481
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18301774.
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lack the authority to stay the mortgage enforcement process.142 Even if his
claim proved meritorious, he risked being permanently dispossessed of the
property.143 When Mr. Aziz complained of the limited nature of the
enforcement proceedings, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil referred the matter to
the ECJ. As an initial step, the Advocate General made recommendations144
that were then transmitted to the Court’s first chamber for a preliminary
ruling.145
Aziz’s loan was plagued by several detrimental characteristics. The
contract precluded any flexibility in the borrower’s repayment schedule.
Instead, it permitted Caixa to demand payment of the entire loan upon the
borrower’s failure to timely submit any of the scheduled monthly
payments.146 The contract terms also permitted Caixa, without any input
from Mr. Aziz, to state the amount due and owing by providing the court
with a certified statement.147 Although he received notice, Mr. Aziz was not
actually entitled to notice of his default under the mortgage documents.148
The agreement also provided that upon default, all amounts due and owing
(i.e., principal and interest) would be subject to the hefty default interest rate
of 18.75%.149 Because Caixa was allowed to accelerate,150 it meant that the
18.75% interest rate was applied to the entire outstanding balance, not just
to the missed monthly payments.151 The default interest was “calculated on
a daily basis.”152 Following Aziz’s failure to make his monthly payment,
142. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 55 (referencing L.E. Civ. art. 698 (Spain)).
143. The ECJ noted that:
[U]nder Spanish rules of procedure, the final vesting of mortgaged property in a third party is
always irreversible, even if the unfairness of the term challenged by the consumer before the
court hearing the declaratory proceedings results in the annulment of the mortgage enforcement
proceedings, except where that consumer made a preliminary registration of the application for
annulment of the mortgage before that marginal note.
Id. ¶ 57.
144. Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 64, 76; see Stina Haglund, The Role of the Advocate General
and the Development of Direct Effect, ÖREBRO UNIVERSITET: EU CONST. L. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2012),
https://eulaworebro.wordpress.com/2012/08/13/the-role-of-the-advocate-general-and-the-develo pmentof-direct-effect/ (“The role of the Advocate General is to propose an independent legal solution . . . . [T]he
Court is not obligated to follow the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General.”).
145. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 30.
146. Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 14, 69.
147. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 22.
148. According to the facts, the bank did notify Aziz regarding the initiation of the process. Id. ¶¶
14, 20–21.
149. Mr. Aziz’s mortgage started at the low “teaser” annual interest rate of 4.87% for a little over a
year (17 months). After that, the loan was subject to a variable rate linked to the Euribor (plus 1.10%).
Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 13, 15.
150. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 21.
151. Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 15, 81.
152. Id. para. 14.
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Caixa filed an action seeking to collect the outstanding amount including
contractual and default interest.153 Caixa sent Mr. Aziz notice of the action.
When he failed to pay the stated amount, Caixa initiated the enforcement
proceeding, which included foreclosure.154 In order to halt the procedure,
Aziz would have needed to pay “the unpaid contractual instal[l]ments at the
time of enforcement, plus interest, costs and disbursements relating to those
instal[l]ments.”155
The absence of any competitive bidders at the public judicial auction
foreclosure made it possible for Caixa to assume title of Aziz’s home.156
Under Spanish mortgage law at the time of the proceeding, banks were
permitted to take title to foreclosed homes at fifty percent of their appraised
value, assuming the absence of any higher bids at the auction.157 Taking
advantage of this, Caixa assumed ownership of his home for EUR 97,200.158
This was drastically lower than EUR 194,000, which was Caixa’s valuation
of the property at the time Aziz entered into the loan agreement.159 Because
Aziz had a recourse loan and the value credited for the property did not cover
the outstanding balance, he continued to owe the bank even after he was
evicted.160 His remaining indebtedness totaled approximately EUR
40,000.161
Aziz did not participate in the enforcement proceeding,162 which was
conducted before the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 5 de Martorell.163
Instead, several months after its conclusion, as the court awarded the
property to the bank, Aziz filed his case before the Commercial Court No. 3
of Barcelona. He challenged the terms of his loan agreement and sought to
annul the proceedings granting the bank his home.164 Prior to referring the
matter to the Advocate General, the commercial court drafted a more
extensive list of matters on which it sought guidance.165

153. Id. paras. 21–23.
154. Id.
155. Id. para. 26.
156. Id. para. 28.
157. Id.; C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 26 (Mar.
14, 2013).
158. Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, para. 28.
159. Id. paras. 12, 17; SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 49.
160. Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, para. 28.
161. Id. paras. 20, 22, 28.
162. Id. para. 26.
163. Id. para. 23.
164. Id. para. 29; C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶
27 (Mar. 14, 2013)..
165. See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 30.
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Reviewing the elements of Mr. Aziz’s case establishes a foundation to
understand the private contractual and procedural landscape confronting
Spain’s residential borrowers before the ECJ’s interpretation of the UCT
Directive. This context is essential to appreciating the difference the
Directive makes. Further, the background is necessary to my response to the
scholarly debate between private law purists and public law enthusiasts in
Part VI.
b. Procedural Ruling
The first part of the ECJ’s ruling pertains to procedure. Specifically,
Member States cannot both exclude the possibility of challenging the
validity of the contractual terms of the mortgage during enforcement
proceedings and deny any means of relief in an alternative judicial forum.166
The government must grant borrowers some venue to contest the substance
of their loan agreements. The disjuncture between consumer relief and
creditor enforcement violates the “principle of effectiveness.”167 The
principle is salient to whether the objectives of the Directive can be met or
whether they are frustrated by domestic laws. The Court interpreted
“effectiveness” to mean that a remedy equal to what the plaintiff is seeking—
in this instance, undo the foreclosure so that Aziz could retain his property—
was required.168 A monetary remedy under these circumstances would be
insufficient.169 The Court opined that Member States must establish a judicial
process that has the competency to resolve cases that raise unfairness issues
with respect to residential mortgage loans.170 Courts should be able to
intervene in or delay enforcement proceedings, where necessary, to provide
borrowers with judicial relief where borrowers challenge the substance of
the mortgage agreement, including the inequity of its terms.171 Furthermore,
where the national court determines that a contractual term is unfair, there
must be a process to ensure removal of the term from future consumer
contracts. 172

166. Id. ¶¶ 64, 77.
167. Id. ¶ 63.
168. Id. ¶ 60.
169. Id. ¶ 63 (“[T]he Spanish legislation at issue . . . makes the application of the protection which
the directive seeks to confer on . . . [mortgage] consumers impossible or excessively difficult.”); see
Fernando Gómez Pomar & Karolina Lyczkowska, Spanish Courts, the Court of Justice of the European
Union, and Consumer Law, INDRET, Oct. 2014, at 15–16 (Spain) (discussing the effect that the Judgment
of 14th March 2013 (Case C-415/11, Aziz) had on Spanish Law).
170. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 49, 52, 59, 63–64.
171. Id. ¶ 64.
172. Id. ¶¶ 60, 77.
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c. Substantive Ruling—Test for Unfairness
The second part of the ruling relates to the question of what constitutes
an unfair term and provides guidelines for national courts to make that
determination.173 Article 3(1) of the Directive deals with the matter of
unfairness and provides:
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of
the consumer.174

An initial step towards determining unfairness is assessing the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract.175 The question of
whether the parties engaged in contractual bargaining to establish the terms
of the deal is paramount.176 Absence of negotiation is signaled by a contract
that “has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been
able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a
pre-formulated standard contract.”177 Although Article 3 does not use the
same term, the description provided fits what American law refers to as a
contract of adhesion.178 As in the United States, contracts of adhesion in the
EU framework are not necessarily illegal or unconscionable, and, therefore,
the legality determination has to be made separately. There are many
circumstances under which such contracts or terms will be upheld as valid.179
173. Id. ¶ 66.
174. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76. The directive was subsequently amended by Council
Directive 2011/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on Consumer
Rights. Council Directive 2011/83, art. 1, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, 71.
175. See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 74, 76–77(2); Council Commission
Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 4, 5–6, 11.
176. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 74, 76–77(2). Council Commission
Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 5–6, 11.
177. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 3(2); see Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo v.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para 5(2) (July 17, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=155118&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18291823.
178. Such contracts have generated considerable debate, suspicion, and disdain in the United States.
A contract of adhesion is “a take-it-or-leave-it standard form agreement, usually presented to a consumer
by a business entity.” Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion,
28 YALE J. REG. 313, 346 (2011) (footnote omitted); see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1983) (“Contracts of adhesion—standard
form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—are ubiquitous in modern commercial life . . . .”).
The UCT Directive is particularly concerned with addressing unilateral boilerplate contracts and “the
unfair exclusion of essential rights in contracts.” Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, pmbl. (internal
quotations omitted). Because of the absence of meaningful choice or ability to bargain on the part of the
weaker party, many scholars have heavily criticized this type of agreement.
179. Such contracts have not been declared per se illegal because many recognize efficiencies
associated with standardization. Schwartz, supra note 178, at 354.
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The determination of whether the formulation of the contract grew out of
unilateral or mutual bargaining sets up further inquiry into contractual
unfairness.180
The Directive offers some insight into what good faith requires. Where
a party is unduly advantaged and the consumer is significantly disadvantaged
to the point of inflicting harm on the latter, good faith has not been met. The
ECJ strikes a balance between consumer and supplier181 in ruling that the
relevant inquiry is whether “the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and
equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer
would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract
negotiations.”182 As I argue in Part VI, this test is not an easy one to
administer. It not only requires a court’s assessment of what is fair and
equitable, but also what would be a reasonable assumption on the part of the
seller concerning the contractual terms presented to a consumer.
The Directive uses the phrase “significant imbalance” to evaluate
unfairness. The phrase refers to the positioning of the parties. Determining
whether a significant imbalance exists “requires an examination as to how a
contract term influences the rights and obligations of the parties.”183 Parties
establish and define the terms of their contracts in the first instance.
However, as the Aziz Court recognized, once a contract is formed, a party
may contest the fairness of a term by alleging it causes a significant
imbalance; meaning that it unduly burdens the complainant party in his
performance.184 National courts must evaluate the challenged term in relation
to national laws to determine whether “the contract places the consumer in a
legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national law in
force” and, if this is the case, to what degree.185 For example, if national law
requires that borrowers be given sixty days advance notice before filling
enforcement proceedings, a contract that suspends with notice or adopts a
shorter notice period will be heavily scrutinized. Nonetheless, even though

180. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 69, 77(2); Council Commission Notice
93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 5–6, 11.
181. The UCT Directive Preamble instructs:
. . . in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the
bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the
term and whether the goods and services were sold or supplied to the special order of the
consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier
where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has taken
into account.
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, pmbl.
182. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 69.
183. Council Commission Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, para. 3.4.1.
184. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 77(2).
185. Id.
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the contract is unfavorable towards the borrower, it still may fall within legal
bounds.186 It is noteworthy that the Member State is implicated in the
assessment of contractual fairness. According to the ECJ, it is necessary to
consider “the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at
his disposal, under national law, to prevent continued use of unfair terms.”187
The Court’s ruling reveals its contemplation of the power differential
between consumers, corporations, and governments. Governments,
typically, are endowed with greater powers to impose even-handed terms in
transactions.
To facilitate a court’s determination of whether unfair terms are present,
the Directive includes a list of examples illustrating how unfair terms
operate. For example, a term or contractual clause, “enabling the seller or
supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason
which is specified in the contract,” may be held as unfair.188 The ECJ ruled
that the list must be interpreted in the same manner as the Directive describes
it. That is, it should be viewed as an “indicative” but “non-exhaustive list of
the terms which may be regarded as unfair.”189 The absence of a term from
the list, should not be deemed as dispositive of the issue of whether it is
unfair. Once a judicial determination of unfairness has been rendered, the
Directive requires that the term or contractual provision be excised from the
contract.190
Aziz highlighted both the acceleration clause, which enabled Caixa to
establish the default interest rate, and the clause that permitted Caixa to
unilaterally calculate the outstanding balance.191 Because the domestic court
has the initial responsibility to assess the unfairness of contractual terms,192
the ECJ declined to rule upon the contract’s substance.193 Instead, the Court
imposed guidelines that national courts should consider.194 National courts
must: balance the import of the consumer’s breach with the overall substance
and goals of the contract to determine if acceleration is warranted;195 consult

186. Id. ¶ 77.
187. Id. ¶ 77(2).
188. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 3(3), annex para. (j).
189. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 70, 77; Council Directive 93/13, supra
note 76, art. 3(3).
190. See Gómez Pomar & Lyczkowska, supra note 169 (noting that under Spanish Law a clause
must be eliminated after being held unfair and replaced by the applicable default legal regime to fill the
gap in the contract).
191. Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 65.
192. Id. ¶¶ 66–67.
193. Id. ¶ 66.
194. Id.
195. Specifically, the ECJ ruled that the national court must consider:
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national law and, in particular, the statutory interest rate to determine
whether the challenged interest rate falls within those boundaries;196 consider
whether the term challenged is in the vein of the agreement between the
parties or whether there is an apparent conflict between the term and the
nature of the agreement that would ultimately impair the consumer’s ability
to protect himself against the threatened harm.
The relevance of the Aziz decision lies in the protective space it carves
out for consumers in the domain of housing. The Court articulated a
framework for assessing the unfairness of residential mortgage loan terms.197
The interpretation of the UCT Directive provides litigants with a basis to
challenge their contractual terms and the domestic procedural rules
pertaining to housing transactions. Member States are also put on notice of
their obligations to make domestic procedural rules conform to Directive
mandates. Freedom of contract is constrained by the principle of unfairness;
unfair contracts will not be enforced.
2. Elaborating Principles of Consumer Protection
The ECJ’s revisiting of the UCT Directive in Sánchez Morcillo and
Abril Garcia v. Banco Bilbao,198 a year later, followed by the cases Unicaja
Banco, S.A. v. Hidalgo Rueda et al.199 and Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco
S.A.U.,200 confirm that the Court has more than a fleeting interest in
addressing inequities in private housing transactions and procedural
inequalities accruing to the benefit of corporate and government interests.201
The following decisions clarify rights, obligations, and duties of Member
States and lenders. The cases evidence an ongoing dialogue with Spain, and
. . . whether the right of the seller or supplier to call in the totality of the loan is conditional
upon the non-compliance by the consumer with an obligation which is of essential importance
in the contest of the contractual relationship in question, whether that right is provided for in
cases in which such non-compliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount
of the loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant applicable rules and whether national
law provides for adequate and effective means enabling the consumer subject to such a term to
remedy the effects of the loan being called in.
Id. ¶ 73 (emphasis added).
196. Id. ¶ 74.
197. Id.
198. Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 2014
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099 (July 17, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=155118&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18291823.
199. Joined Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 & C-487/13, Unicaja Banco, SA v. Hidalgo
Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482 (Jan. 21, 2015).
200. Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, 2016
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154 (Dec. 21, 2016).
201. See Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, paras. 37, 44–45; see also Hidalgo Rueda, 2015
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 23; Gutiérrez Naranjo, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX WL
62015CJ0154, ¶¶ 28, 30.
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the larger EU community, regarding private law contracts and public harm
and demonstrate a deepening of the ECJ’s commitment to the welfare of
housing consumers and housing markets.
a. Expanding Procedural Protections in Morcillo
Morcillo concerned the differential treatment accorded to lenders as
compared to borrowers under new domestic procedural laws pertaining to
the enforcement of mortgages.202 The ECJ scrutinized Spain’s procedural
rules, which treated banks (suppliers) differently from borrowers
(consumers) when bringing an appeal.203 Whereas lenders could appeal a
court’s decision dismissing their enforcement proceedings or voiding a term,
borrowers did not enjoy the same latitude. Without the ability to appeal a
“judgment at first instance,”204 they had no mechanism to halt their mortgage
enforcement proceedings despite underlying fairness issues concerning the
mortgage contract.205 Cases, like Morcillo, chronicle the country’s fretful
process of revising its mortgage laws contemporaneously with the Aziz
decision in order to bring them in conformity with the UCT Directive. Law
1/2013 is one such example.206
In Morcillo, the applicants entered into a residential mortgage loan on
June 9, 2003 with Banco Bilbao for EUR 300,500.207 The loan provided for
a default interest rate of “19% per annum” in contrast to the statutory interest
of “4% per annum.”208 Some years later, after the applicants missed several
payments, Banco Bilbao sought to collect the entire loan, including ordinary
and default interest, in conjunction with an order for the sale of the
mortgaged property.209 While the referring court210 limited its request for a
202. Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 19.
203. The procedural rule at issue was L.E. Civ., art. 695 (Spain). Id. paras. 37, 44–45.
204. Id. para. 17.
205. Id. paras. 17, 33, 42.
206. Spain’s Law 1/2013 is an expansive law with numerous sections implementing protections for
mortgage borrowers and changes to social rents. As various parts have been challenged, Spain has made
revisions and adopted transitional legislation. The case BBVA S.A. v. Pedro Peñalva López is illustrative
of the ongoing exchange between Spain’s legislature and the transnational court regarding what
constitutes fairness in mortgage transactions. In BBVA, the domestic court sought a preliminary ruling
regarding the one-month time limit for challenging enforcement of mortgage proceedings, implemented
by the transitional law in the wake of the Aziz case. The ECJ ruled that Article 6 and 7 of the UCT
Directive “preclud[ed] a national transitional provision . . . which . . . imposes a time-limit on consumers
calculated from the day following the publication of that law to object to enforcement on the basis of the
alleged unfairness of contractual terms.” Case C-8/14, BBVA S.A. v. Peñalva López, 2015 EUR-Lex
CELEX WL 62014CJ0008, ¶ 43 (Oct. 29, 2015).
207. Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 13.
208. Id. para. 14.
209. Id. para. 15.
210. The referring court was the Audiencia Provincial de Castellón. Id. para. 16.
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preliminary ruling to questions concerning Spain’s procedural rules and their
compliance with Article 7 of the UCT Directive211 and Article 47212 of the
EU Charter, it noted that loan terms like Morcillo’s default interest rate could
be challenged for unfairness.213
Grounding its decision in the principles of effectiveness and equality
and the Directive’s instruction that consumers are not bound by unfair
terms,214 the ECJ ruled that the contested rules violated EU laws.215 Because
they granted creditors and borrowers different relief, the rules contravened
the equality of arms principle.216 This principle requires that parties have an
equal opportunity to present their cases before a tribunal.217 Article 695 of
Spain’s civil procedure code significantly disadvantaged the debtor in that
once his house was repossessed by the bank and sold, in most cases, the sale
could not be undone. The sole remedy left to the borrower would be
compensatory damages, an unsatisfactory substitute for the debtor’s desired
remedy of remaining in place.218 The ECJ further concluded that Spain’s
rules violated the effectiveness principle and frustrated the requirement of
“judicial protection.”219 In weighing the potential harms of delaying any
relief due to lenders, as compared to the borrowers’ “risk of losing their
dwelling in an enforced sale,”220 the ECJ favored the latter.
From Morcillo, one can discern a central principle mandating that even
though the economic market grants certain participants a position of
dominance in their contractual relations, under limited conditions, the Court
may alter the imbalance. An essential restriction on Member States is that
211. Article 7(1) compels Member States to “ensure that, in the interests of consumers and
competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts
concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.” Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 7.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 offer examples of how the prevention of unfair terms may be achieved.
Id.
212. Article 47 of the Charter guarantees the “right to an effective remedy before a tribunal.” EU
Charter, supra note 81, art. 47.
213. Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 18.
214. Id. para. 50. The Court explained that the objective of the rule is to “replace the formal balance
which the contract establishes between the rights and obligations of the parties with an effective balance
which re-establishes equality between them.” Id. para. 23. Domestic legislation precluding a mortgage
enforcement court from reviewing the unfairness of terms in the debt contract at issue is prohibited by
the UCT Directive. Id. paras. 24 and 26.
215. Id. para. 52.
216. See id. para. 49 (“The principle of equality of arms . . . is no more than a corollary of a fair
hearing that implies an obligation to offer each party a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case in
conditions that do not place it in a clearly less advantageous position compared with its opponent.”).
217. Id. paras. 36, 38.
218. Id. para. 43 (concluding that a monetary remedy would be “incomplete and insufficient”).
219. Id. paras. 48–50.
220. Id. para. 43.
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their rules must not undermine or circumvent the protections of the
Directive.221 The procedural rules should maintain the borrower in the
position he was in prior to the commencement of the enforcement hearing,
in case his claim is deemed meritorious.222
b. Remedying Substantively Unfair Agreements in Hidalgo and
Naranjo
i. Hidalgo
Rather than highlighting the asymmetrical power relationships between
banks and borrowers, in Unicaja Banco v. Hidalgo, the ECJ instructed
domestic courts on their obligations under the Directive.223 While evaluating
the unfairness of the default rate and the terms of acceleration, the issue of
an ostensible conflict between Spain’s domestic law and the UCT Directive
arose. The commercial tribunal224 referred the cases to the ECJ for a
determination of the proper procedure once a court finds that a term is unfair.
The essential inquiry was: after a finding of unfairness, is the deciding court
required to void and excise an unfair term or can it modify the term, or
substitute another, to bring it into compliance with the Directive?225
Hidalgo226 involved several individuals who defaulted on their
respective mortgage loans, ranging from EUR 47,000 to EUR 249,000.227
The Unicaja Banco and Caxiabank, separately, instituted mortgage
enforcement proceedings.228 The dispute concerned the fairness of default

221. Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, 2016
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154, ¶ 66 (Dec. 21, 2016).
222. See Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, paras. 43, 51 (suggesting that the status quo
could be accomplished by granting the deciding court the procedural power to stay the mortgage
enforcement proceedings).
223. Joined Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 & C-487/13, Unicaja Banco, S.A. v. Hidalgo
Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 26 (Jan. 15, 2015).
224. The referring court was the Juzgado de Primera e Instrucción de Marchena (Spain). Hidalgo
Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 23; Joined Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 &
C-487/13, Unicaja Banco, S.A. v. Hidalgo Rueda, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CC0482, ¶ 48 (Oct.
16, 2014).
225. Hidalgo Rueda, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CC0482, ¶¶ 17, 23, 26; Hidalgo Rueda,
2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶¶ 23, 26. Article 6 was at the center of the ECJ’s analysis.
Article 6 requires Member States to adopt a law declaring that “unfair terms used in a contract concluded
with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall . . . not be binding on the consumer and that the contract
shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence.” Council
Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 6.
226. Hidalgo is composed of four cases filed by Unicaja Banco and Caixabank that were later
consolidated. See id. ¶ 2.
227. Id. ¶ 18.
228. Id. ¶¶ 2, 18.
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interest clauses.229 The clauses permitted the lenders to charge interest in
varying amounts, from eighteen to twenty-five percent per annum.230 All the
loans contained acceleration clauses.231 Under the terms, the banks were able
to apply the default interest rate, which was 22.5% for the majority of
them,232 to the entire outstanding loan balance.233 Spain’s law mandated that
the domestic court should modify the contract by replacing the unfair term
with an acceptable one.234 The gist of the national law was to preserve the
contract at all costs.235 In contrast, the Directive does not authorize courts to
substitute contractual terms.236 Nothing in that instrument grants national
courts the power to reduce a contractual penalty once the court determines
that the penalty clause is unfair.237 Instead, it merely dictates that unfair terms
are not binding on consumers. Member States must take action to ensure that
unfair terms are excised from the contract at issue and from future contracts
between suppliers and sellers.238 The ECJ’s ruling clarified matters. Member
States can confer this authority to modify with certain restrictions.239 That is
essentially what Spain did with its Second Transitional Law 1/2013, which
revised certain parts of its civil procedure laws. The ECJ concluded that a
state may adopt a law that permits the domestic court hearing the mortgage
enforcement proceeding to “adjust the amounts due under a term” downward
so that they are consistent with the statutory rate.240 If, for example, a
mortgage contract provides for a default rate of fifty percent and the statutory
rate imposed by the government is twenty percent, the reviewing court can
adjust the rate to no more than twenty percent.
229. Id. ¶ 21.
230. Id. ¶ 19.
231. Id. ¶ 20.
232. Id. ¶ 19.
233. Id. ¶ 20.
234. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The language is in the codified national law, Article 83 of Royal Legislative
Decree No 1/2007 and is part of the General Law for the protection of consumers and users and other
supplementary laws. Approving the Revised Text of the General Law for the Protection of Consumers
and Users and Other Complementary Laws art. 83 (R.D.L. 2007, 1). The Second Transitional Provision
of Law No 1/2013 enacted May 15, 2013 modified Royal Legislative Decree No 1/2007, but the issue
regarding compelling the mortgage enforcement court to modify the default interest rate remained.
Second Transitional Provision of Law (B.O.E. 2013, 116).
235. See Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 11 (quoting Article 83 of
Royal Legislative Decree No. 1/2007) (“Only where the remaining contract terms result in an imbalance
in the respective positions of the parties which cannot be remedied may the court rule that the contract is
ineffective.”).
236. Id. ¶ 28.
237. Id. ¶ 29.
238. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, arts. 6–7.
239. Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 42.
240. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
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The ECJ further explained that apart from the process, according to
which the reviewing court acknowledges that there is a national law
restricting the substance of the law in question, the reviewing court must
make an independent evaluation of the fairness of the purported unfair
term.241 Furthermore, the local court should not allow the existence of the
national law to color its determination of whether a mortgage loan provision
is unfair. The court should neither be inhibited in evaluating whether the
disputed mortgage loan clause complies with the Directive nor be precluded
from “removing that clause,” where appropriate.242 In assessing the
unfairness of a contract term, a court should consider: (i) the “nature of the
goods and services” that form the basis of the contract;243 (ii) “the
consequences of the term under the [national] law applicable to the
contract;”244 (iii) consistency between the relevant national laws and the
Directive;245 and (iv) its duty to consider the unfairness of a contract term
regardless of the substance of the national law.246 The Directive envisions
that a court could remove an unfair term and the contract could continue on,
remaining largely intact.247 There are circumstances where that is not
possible. If removing the unfair term would result in the court nullifying the
entire contract to the detriment of the consumer, it may substitute an
alternative term provided that the substitute term is consistent with the
Directive and “enables real balance between the rights and obligations of the
parties to be restored.” 248
Hidalgo recognized the latitude of Member States to legislate as they
see fit, in compliance with EU law. Spain’s law compelling their courts to
modify, rather than excise, the terms of default interest within a mortgage
loan contract to bring it into compliance with State law standards was not
prohibited by the Directive.249 From a consumer vantage point, the ruling
does not adequately protect consumers from unduly onerous interest when
the national law permits suppliers to levy extraordinarily high rates. Instead,
the ECJ merely nudges lenders to ensure that the interest rate provisions are
in line with prevailing contractual rates permitted by national law. To the
extent that interest rate standards are reasonable, meaning not unduly
weighted against consumers, the Hidalgo case is helpful to borrowers. Lower
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 37 (referencing Article 4(1) of the Directive).
Id.
Id. ¶ 38.
Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
See Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 6.
Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 33.
Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
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interest rates make contracts more affordable and increase the likelihood that
borrowers will be able to pay the default interest if their economic situation
improves in time, or to recover some of their equity if a foreclosure sale
occurs. Limiting what is permitted in the context of bargaining about
contractual costs may be read as expressing concern for borrowers, which
renders private contracts more humane.
ii. Naranjo
From 2013 to 2015, Aziz, Morcillo, and Hidalgo, built a formidable
edifice in the name of consumer protection. A year later, Naranjo v. Cajasur
Banco S.A.U., deepened the reach of the ECJ into matters of private
residential mortgage contracts.250 Naranjo tackled two prickly issues. One
concerned the extent to which lenders are able to retain the benefits of their
wrongdoing.251 The other dealt with the power of national courts to restrict
the scope of their rulings upon a finding that a contractual term is unfair.252
Naranjo involved three separate lenders253 and cases that were later
consolidated, after referral to the ECJ.254 The disputed loan term was a floor
clause. Floor clauses operate to limit the degree to which a mortgagor can
benefit from decreases in the interest rate index to which his mortgage is
pegged. The clause establishes a base rate of interest that the mortgage
consumer would have to pay even when the prevailing mortgage rate is
substantially lower. The borrowers sought to have their floor clauses
nullified and further demanded reimbursement of the excess amounts they
had paid, previously, as a result of the unfair term’s application.255
In a separate prior collective action case, Spain’s Supreme Court (i.e.
the Tribunal Supremo) held that the floor clauses were unfair and void
because of the lenders’ failures to inform borrowers that their mortgage
contracts contained floor clauses and explain the meaning and effect of such
provisions.256 The Tribunal concluded that the omissions violated the
Directive’s requirements of “good faith, balance and transparency.”257

250. See generally Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur
Banco SAU, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154 (Dec. 21, 2016) (analyzing whether floor clauses
are permissible in mortgage loans agreements).
251. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.
252. Id.
253. The individuals filed cases in various national commercial and provincial courts, against three
separate banks: Cajasur Banco S.A.U., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, Banco Popular Espanol.
Id. ¶¶ 27, 31, 37.
254. Id. ¶¶ 43–45.
255. Id. ¶¶ 28, 31, 38.
256. Id. ¶ 21.
257. Id.
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Emphasizing the importance of consumer knowledge, the Naranjo Court
reasoned that information concerning “contractual conditions and the
consequences of entering into the contract” are essential ingredients to
consumer decisions about whether to become a party to the mortgage loan
transaction.258 When lenders conceal such information, the court must take
this fact into account when evaluating the unfairness of the terms
challenged.259 Regarding the question of the retroactive application of its
ruling, the Tribunal Supremo grounded its decision on the principle of legal
certainty,260 holding that, “the invalidity of the floor clauses in question did
not affect situations in which final decisions had been made in judgments
with the force of res judicata or payments made before May 9, 2013, so that
only payments made after that date had to be repaid.”261
In the underlying Naranjo case, the Tribunal Supremo then extended its
ruling regarding retroactivity to individuals. Individual mortgagors who paid
amounts in accordance with terms of their contract, later adjudicated to be
unfair, could not recuperate all of their past payments. Instead, they were
only entitled to reimbursement of payments made after the Tribunal
Supremo’s decision.262 The referring courts prevailed upon the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling addressing several matters.263 At their core, they
concerned: (i) Whether a domestic court can impose a time frame, limiting
the effect of its ruling, after it has declared a contractual term unfair and void
without violating the Directive’s mandate to Member States to ensure that
consumers are not bound by unfair terms and that consumers have the full
protection of the EU Charter264 and (ii) In making restitution for sums
collected under a term that has been adjudicated as unfair and void, whether
lenders have to return all the money they received in payment under the
unfair term or can the court limit the damages.265

258. Id. ¶ 51.
259. Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
260. Id. ¶ 25.
261. Id.
262. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25–26. On May 9, 2013, the Tribunal Supremo published a decision holding that the
floor clauses at issue in the collective action were void due to the lenders’ inadequate disclosure of them
during the formation of the relevant mortgage contracts. At the time, the court restricted the effect of its
ruling to payments made after the court’s decision. The Tribunal Supremo then, in its ruling of March 25,
2015 (Judgment No 139/2015), “extended to individual actions for redress the approach previously
upheld in the judgment of 9 May 2013 in respect of collective actions for an injunction.” Id. ¶ 41.
Consequently, individuals seeking recovery for the excess amounts they paid in connection with the floor
clauses in their respective contracts were limited to the time period beginning with the March 9, 2013
date, forward. Id. ¶ 26.
263. Id. ¶ 1.
264. Id. ¶ 46 (citing Articles 6 and 7 of the UCT Directive and Article 47 of the EU Charter).
265. Id. ¶¶ 42, 46.
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The ECJ’s Grand Chamber ruled that national courts may not prescribe
their rulings in ways that fail to “restor[e] the consumer to the legal and
factual situation that he would have been in” absent that term.266 Consumers
have a right to restitution for all monies wrongly obtained by the supplier
through the use of unfair terms.267
3. Expanding the Scope of Inquiry in Kušinova
Monika Kušinova v. SMART Capital, a.s.268 is an important bridge
between the ECJ jurisprudence that grew out of Spain’s iterative integration
process involving the UCT Directive, and the human rights housing cases
decided by the UN ESCR Committee. While Kušinova differs from the
foregoing cases in some respects,269 it is an essential part of the narrative
documenting private law’s incorporation of human rights principles where
the home is central to the dispute.
Ms. Kušinova entered into a credit and charge agreement with SMART
Capital for 10,000 euros. As security for the loan, she pledged her home.270
Later, Kušinova sought to annul the agreements, alleging that they were
unfair and the procedural law granting creditors certain enforcement powers
was in violation of both directives and Article 38 of the EU Charter.271 The
agreements and civil code permitted the creditors to possess Kušinova’s
pledged property without court supervision.272 The domestic court273 referred
the matter to the ECJ to resolve whether the civil code’s restraint on judicial
review and the contractual terms of the agreements deprived Kušinova of her
rights under the UCT Directive.274
Leaving to Slovakia’s courts the initial determination of whether the
national civil code was compliant with EU mandates,275 the ECJ concluded
266. Id. ¶ 61.
267. Id. ¶ 66.
268. See generally Case C-34/13, Kušionová v. SMART Capital a.s., 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157486&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18304392 (providing an interpretation of the
“Council Directive 93/13/EEC . . . on unfair terms in consumer contracts” and the “Directive 2005/29/EC
of the European Parliament . . . concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the
internal market.”).
269. See id. para. 1 (explaining that two EU Directives were at play, the UCT Directive and Directive
2005/29/EC, concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market).
270. Id. para. 25.
271. See EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 38 (discussing how Article 38 requires that the EU adopt
policies that “ensure a high level of consumer protection”).
272. Kušinova, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189, para 27.
273. Id. para. 26 (explaining that the referring court was the Regional Court, Prešov (Krajsky súd
Prešov)).
274. Id. paras. 27–28.
275. Id. paras. 79–81.
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that national laws, such as Slovakia’s, which allow lenders to collect debts
without judicial supervision are not per se prohibited by the UCT
Directive.276 While this aspect of the decision is not particularly proconsumer, the ECJ’s reasoning regarding the significance of the home and
the relationship between housing contracts and EU laws is supportive of
housing consumers and is worth quoting at length:
The loss of a family home is not only such as to seriously undermine
consumer rights, but it also places the family of the consumer concerned
in a particularly vulnerable position.
In that regard, the European Court of Human Rights has held, first, that
the loss of a home is one of the most serious breaches of the right to respect
for the home, and secondly, that any person who risks being the victim of
such a breach should be able to have the proportionality of such a measure
reviewed.
Under EU law, the right to accommodation is a fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter that the referring Court must
take into consideration when implementing Directive 93/13. With regard
to the particular consequences of the eviction of the consumer and his
family from the accommodation forming their principal family home, the
Court has already emphasized the importance, for the national court, to
provide for interim measures by which unlawful mortgage enforcement
proceedings may be suspended or terminated where the grant of such
measures proves necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the
protection intended by Directive 93/13.277

There are numerous noteworthy aspects to the Kušinova decision. The
ECJ connected the human right to housing under the EU Charter to the UCT
Directive. The decision emphasized the privileged status accorded to the
residential home. The Court recognized that there is a punitive nature to
dispossession that requires careful judicial scrutiny of the dispossessing
device. Further, the Court instructed that governments must align their
domestic procedural rules so that individuals are able to obtain meaningful
relief in matters pertaining to their housing tenure. Kušinova is part of the
lineage of public law incursions into the private housing law sphere. The
Court’s acknowledgement of the particular “vulnerability” of individuals
under threat of eviction opens up possibilities regarding protections that are
available notwithstanding the private nature of the transaction at issue. Given
the express references to human rights, Kušinova offers an appropriate segue
from private law to the jurisprudence emanating from the sphere of human
rights on housing.
276. Id. para. 68.
277. Id. paras. 63–66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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B. ICESCR Decisions Supporting the Right to Housing
With IDG v. Spain,278 the private law mortgage frame expands more
decisively into the space of international human rights. The UN ESCR
Committee purposefully linked two types of private transactions, lenderbased contracts and landlord-based rental agreements, to the public law right
to housing.279 In transitioning to the public law human rights sphere, this
analysis moves from the ECJ, a judicial entity authorized to interpret
European Union Law for its constituency, to the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The Committee interprets the
ESCR treaty for UN Members who have acceded to or ratified it.280
1. Right to Housing as an Independent Basis for Claims in IDG
IDG presents an opportunity to analyze how issues similar to those
examined in Aziz (e.g., unfair mortgage terms and national civil procedures)
have been filtered and processed through the human rights legal mechanism
of the ESCR Committee. While Ms. IDG focused on the due process
procedural concerns of notice, at the core of her complaint was a demand for
an opportunity to challenge the terms and structuring of her mortgage loan
contract.281 Ms. IDG filed a communication before the Committee on
January 28, 2014, one year after Aziz.282 Like Aziz, IDG concerned the
fairness of Spain’s mortgage procedures concerning borrowers. She took out
financing to purchase her home, appraised at €742,890.68.283 After missing
several payments, her lender accelerated the loan and commenced
enforcement.284 The lender sought to collect €381,153.66 (principal),
€5,725.80 (ordinary interest), and €856.77 (default interest).”285
Enforcement included auctioning the property.286 Authorized by the
enforcement courts, and at the lender’s request, a state agent made four
attempts to hand-deliver notification of the auction to IDG without

278. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Views of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (fifty-fifth session) Concerning Communication No. 2/2014, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (June 2015) [hereinafter IDG].
279. Id. para. 12.1.
280. Eighteen independent experts who are elected by State parties sit on the ESCR Committee.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
281. IDG, supra note 278, para. 3.4.
282. Id. para. 2.16.
283. Id. para. 2.1.
284. Id. paras. 2.3, 10.6.
285. Id. para. 2.3.
286. Id.
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success.287 The agent then posted the notice of the enforcement proceeding’s
location on the courthouse board.288
Relying upon ICESCR’s provisions, Ms. IDG argued that Spain’s
mortgage enforcement procedures, especially for notice, violated her right to
housing,289 and her right to a remedy.290 The latter provision requires States
to accomplish, “progressively,” the “full realization”291 of the rights
enumerated in ICESCR.292 Ms. IDG alleged that because the lender failed to
serve her with actual notice at the two critical stages of initiating the
enforcement proceeding and initiating the auction of her house, she was
deprived of the opportunity to present a solid defense against the bank’s
allegations of purported amounts she owed and regarding any unfair terms
in her mortgage contract.293 The Committee agreed,294 noting that the right
to housing is a “fundamental right central to the enjoyment of all economic,
social and cultural rights[] and is inextricably linked to other human
rights . . . .”295 Under the ICESCR, the right to housing means “the right to
live somewhere in security, peace, and dignity.”296 For forced evictions,
extra precautions must be taken by the government in constructing its
procedural rules of notice and process to ensure access to judicial
remedies.297 Corresponding to housing scholar Matthew Desmond’s
argument that evictions are a corrosive force within American society, the
Committee expressed disdain for the constant uprooting of individuals and
families solely for the purpose of serving lenders, landlords, or corporate
interests without appropriate legal safeguards and process.298 If left
unregulated, not only do evictions threaten human dignity, they undermine
the socio-economic stability of nations. While public posting may be a valid
287. Id. para. 2.4.
288. Id. para. 2.5.
289. See ICESCR, supra note 117.
290. IDG, supra note 278, para. 11.4; ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 5.
291. ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 2 ¶ 1.
292. IDG, supra note 278, para. 3.5.
293. Id. paras. 3.3–3.5.
294. Id. paras. 12.4, 13.5, 15.
295. Id. para. 11.1.
296. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts., The Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet
No. 21/Rev., at 1–3 (2014); U.N., Off. of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., CESCR General Comment
No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), para. 7, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 4].
297. IDG, supra note 278, para. 11.2. The Committee referenced its General Comment 7 in which
it elaborates on this point of sufficient access to judicial process and remedies.
298. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 295–99
(2016); IDG, supra note 278, paras. 11.1–11.2, 11.4, 12.1, 12.3, 17(c); General Comment No. 4, supra
note 296, ¶¶ 8(a), 17–18; U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Rep. on
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Sessions, annex IV, paras. 1, 3, 8, 11–16, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (1998).
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method for serving notice of housing proceedings, it should be used only as
a “measure of last resort,” especially when dealing with evictions.299
The Committee’s logic parallels the ECJ’s in Aziz.300 Both adjudicatory
entities recognized that the failure to provide borrowers with a meaningful
process, where the loss of the claimant’s home is involved, constitutes a
violation of the international legal instrument invoked. Notwithstanding the
advances IDG makes in connecting private law and public human rights, the
case has significant limitations. The Committee declined to issue a broad
ruling.301 Furthermore, the Committee did not rule upon the specific terms
within Ms. IDG’s mortgage loan document. While the ESCR panel can make
determinations as to whether a state’s procedural process for enforcing
mortgage proceedings is fair and in compliance with the treaty, the question
of whether the Committee may properly invalidate the terms of loan
contracts based on unfairness remains unresolved. It is clear, however, that
while the right to housing may remain the basis of the claim, the sources for
determining fairness may not include the UCT Directive, expressly, since the
interpretation of the Directive remains outside the competency of the
Committee. For a ruling on the unfairness of mortgage terms, Ms. IDG will
need to return to Spain’s courts. If she can find no proper hearing on
substantive issues, she may appear again before the ESCR Committee. If this
proves insufficient, she may find herself before the ECtHR or before the ECJ,
although the basis of the claims would be different. IDG could draw upon
the ECHR if she chooses the ECtHR as her forum. If she chooses the ECJ to
present a claim, she may rely upon the Charter or any of the relevant EU
regulations.
Even in the absence of a substantive ruling on the unfairness of Ms.
IDG’s mortgage contract terms, the case demonstrates that housing
complainants who are participants in other juridical spaces may look across
regimes for arguments, inspiration, and paradigms.

299. IDG, supra note 278, para. 12.3.
300. At the time of the posting, the ECJ had not yet issued its Aziz ruling. The posture of Spain’s
procedural law, in that moment, left Ms. IDG without a forum to both contest the terms in her mortgage
contract and suspend the enforcement proceeding, pending a decision.
301. IDG, supra note 278, para. 13.5 (“Given the specificity of the problem of inadequate notice
posed by the author, the Committee is not required, in the context of this communication, to consider
whether or not the State party’s internal rules governing mortgage enforcement procedures and the
possible auctioning of mortgaged properties, which may be dwellings, are generally consistent with the
right to housing.”).
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2. Obligations of the State in MBD v. Spain
In MBD v. Spain,302 the International Committee reimagines the
boundaries between the public and private law spheres. The Committee
develops a policy view on forced evictions and housing-related rights that
may be adjudicated by courts. MBD not only concerns private leasing
arrangements and the right to housing, it implicates the State.303 In MBD, Mr.
Djazia and Ms. Bellili resided in a rented apartment in Madrid, paying their
rent to a private landlord without significant incident for several years until
they encountered financial difficulties. Without sufficient income to
continue their rental payments, they were evicted and left homeless.304
Shortly after their landlord moved to evict them, they filed suit before the
Committee, drawing on provisions in the ICESCR.305 The laws governing
the eviction process did not allow tenants to challenge the substantive basis
of the rental contract or the landlord’s enforcement. They only permitted
tenants to raise the defense that the deficient rent payments were actually
paid. Djazia and Bellili alleged that this procedure was faulty in that it denied
renter due process.306 They further alleged that Spain violated their right to
“decent and adequate housing” in ignoring their repeated requests to be
relocated to public rental housing and for subsistence payments.307 The
Committee agreed.308
Recognizing that the ICESCR grants broad rights and protections to
individuals, the Committee concluded that the guarantees associated with the
right to housing extend “to persons living in rental accommodation, whether
public or private” and that “such persons should enjoy the right to housing
even when the lease expires.”309 Notwithstanding that the State was not the
primary instigator behind the eviction, the Committee reasoned that
302. MBD, supra note 57. The ESCR Committee adopted its views on the case on June 20, 2017.
Id. paras. 18–22.
303. The State alleged that the complaint did not fall within the purview of Article 11. Id. para. 12.7.
The ESCR Committee concluded: “although the Covenant primarily establishes rights and obligations
between the State and individuals, the scope of the provisions of the Covenant extends to relations
between individuals. An eviction related to a rental contract between individuals can, therefore, involve
Covenant rights.” Id. para. 14.2.
304. Id. paras. 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 2.19.
305. Id. paras. 1.1, 4.1. The complainants filed suit under Article 11(1) and Article I(e) and (f) and
Article 4. Id.
306. Id. para. 16.4.
307. Id. paras. 2.11, 3.1.
308. Id. paras. 13.1–13.3, 20. Here, again, although the Committee does not expressly reference Aziz,
the logic of Aziz is apparent from the emphasis on the denial of equitable legal procedures to housing
consumers. See id. para. 16.4 (noting that the legislation does not provide defendants in juridical eviction
proceedings the opportunity to explain the consequences of the eviction). Cf. Case C-415/11, Aziz v.
Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 61 (Mar. 14, 2013).
309. MBD, supra note 57, para. 13.2.
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individuals who lease from private landlords should be able to draw upon
international legal buffers to prevent forced eviction.310 The private nature of
a landlord-tenant transaction does not negate the State’s responsibilities to
ensure that individual human rights are respected in the enforcement of the
contract.311 Because the State “bears the ultimate responsibility,”312 it must
ensure that the right to housing is not transgressed in the administration or
outcome of the eviction, and must devise laws to achieve this end.313 Being
duty bound means that when individuals are facing impending eviction and
they have requested government assistance, the parties must not be left
homeless.314 Forced evictions are “prima facie incompatible with the
requirements of the Covenant and can be justified only in the most
exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of
international law.”315 This is remarkable.316 If Spain is held to this standard,
it must substantially expand its social housing network. There are limits,
however, to the intervention of public law in private transactions. The right
to housing does not preclude landlords from evicting tenants. Instead, it
restricts the manner in which landlords may do so. Tenant evictions are
permissible, provided they are carried out as a “last resort and that the
persons concerned have had prior access to an effective judicial remedy” to
scrutinize the merits of the eviction action.317
The MBD ruling permits States to intrude in the individual private
ordering of housing contracts. There is a rational link to the functioning of
housing markets. Homelessness strains municipal resources and gives rise to

310. Id.
311. Id. para. 14.1.
312. Id.
313. Id. paras. 14.1–14.2. Particularly, where minor children are involved, as was the circumstance
in MBD, the State has a heightened duty to prevent homelessness. See id. paras. 15.2, 16.6 (clarifying that
the State has a greater duty to justify why it was unable to uphold the right to housing when children are
involved).
314. IDG, supra note 278, paras. 6.1–6.5.
315. Id. para. 11.1.
316. The ESCR Committee ruling advances an important “precedent” in human rights literature. I
am referring to Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom. Despite the progressive nature
of South Africa’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court interpreted the right to housing in a constrained
way. It held that the constitutional right to housing, contained in Section 26, is circumscribed by the
availability of resources. Neither the government’s failures nor the dire circumstances of homelessness
entitled the claimants to rely upon the self-help remedy of squatting. On the positive side, the Court held
that the State was in violation of the housing right because of the manner in which it evicted squattercomplainants. The Court also weighed in on a longstanding debate concerning whether socio-economic
rights are aspirational or concrete. The Court concluded that the Constitution confers real rights that the
State has an obligation to realize and protect. See Government of The Republic of South Africa v.
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
317. MBD, supra note 57, para. 15.1.
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health, safety, and welfare issues.318 A substantial homeless presence raises
questions about the socio-economic agendas of municipalities and their
ability to serve their populaces fairly and equitably. From a social justice
perspective, this is not a problem that is solved by merely cordoning off the
displaced. This explains the UN Committee’s human rights approach of
holding the government liable319 because governments can act in impactful
ways to lessen the frequency of evictions leading to homelessness.
Governments can design laws, ordinances, and model landlord-tenant
contracts that more evenly balance the protections accorded to each party.320
One can read the MBD decision as incentivizing governments in this
direction.321 The ruling also speaks to those in the law and economics camp
by implicitly recognizing that if a significant portion of a nation’s market
participants are harmed by laws that prevent them from acting as consumers,
there is a market failure that needs to be addressed. Where unfettered markets
are unable to perform the task, regulations are needed.
The MBD decision illustrates how supranational adjudicatory organs
can facilitate the realization of human rights principles. Spain’s Constitution,
for example, contains a mandate that government should deter excessive land
speculation, because such speculation ultimately harms individuals and
strains government resources.322 Individuals either end up paying higher
rents because of land speculation or are priced out of the market entirely. In
those instances, they will seek public assistance to help cover their housing
costs. Yet Spain, prior to and during the 2008 economic crisis, contributed
to rampant speculation, which exacerbated the nation’s housing issues. In
2013, the Madrid Housing Institute “sold 2,935 [public] homes to private

318. Potentially, a homeless person could bring a claim against the government for failing to provide
public housing or, at a minimum, for failing to provide a bed in a public shelter.
319. The ESCR Committee determined that Spain violated the right to housing and that, as a remedy,
the complainants should be given public housing and paid compensatory damages related to the violation
and for reasonable legal costs related to bringing the action before the Committee. Id. para. 20.
320. As the Committee proposed, States may use any combination of subsidies and laws to meet
their obligations, but “any measures adopted must be deliberate, specific and as straightforward as
possible to fulfill [the] right as swiftly and efficiently as possible.” Id. para. 15.3.
321. The ESCR Committee goes even further in Albán v. Spain, 2019, by elaborating on the
extensive duties of the government to: “take all appropriate measures to the maximum of its available
resources, to ensure that adequate alternate housing, resettlement, or access to public land, as the case
may be, is available[], and “resolve . . . structural problems” related to homelessness. See U.N., Econ. &
Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ, Soc. and Cultural Rts., Views Adopted by the Committee Under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concerning
Communication No. 37/2018, paras. 9.1, 10.2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/66/D/37/2018 (2019).
322. See C.E., supra note 82, art. 47 (“The public authorities shall promote the necessary conditions
and shall establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective, regulating land use in
accordance with the general interest in order to prevent speculation.”).
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companies/investment funds”323 for 201 million euros.324 Madrid brokered
this deal at a time when its public housing inventory had already been
seriously depleted. The government’s explanation for privatizing desperately
needed public housing was that it was necessary to address budgetary
deficits.325 Heavily criticizing Spain’s actions, the ESCR Committee advised
that, “[i]n severe economic and financial crisis, all budgetary changes or
adjustments, affecting policies must be temporary, necessary, proportional
and non-discriminatory. . . .”326 Privatizing social housing, effectively
removing it from the public commons327 contributes to the “structural causes
of the lack of housing”328 rather than remedying them. The ESCR Committee
urged the government to be more proactive on the side of drafting legislation
aimed at protecting tenants and those in need of housing, and to refrain from
engaging with developers in a manner that fosters reckless unbounded
speculation rather than deterring it.
C. Cases and the New Rules for the Mortgage, Rental Housing, and
Subsidized Housing Markets
The cases examined in this section carve out new rules in the mortgage,
rental housing, and subsidized housing markets. At the national level, the
majority of the claims were styled as attacks on the unfairness of the
mortgage loan or rental contract terms. At the supranational level, many
claims were transformed into ones concerning the unfairness of domestic
legal procedures. With respect to procedure, the cases articulate guidelines
and rules about timing, notice, dispossession, and equality in due process and
appeals. The meaning of unfairness in housing contractual relations is
developed in judicial discourse. Rhetorically, the home is given sacrosanct
status. As the ECJ concluded, “[where] the mortgaged property is the family
home of the consumer whose rights have been infringed [upon],” appropriate
measures must be in place “to prevent the definitive and irreversible loss of

323. MBD, supra note 57, para. 12.4.
324. Id. paras. 5.5, 12.4.
325. Public interest may be defined in several ways. According to one view, the public interest is
served by having the debts of the country reduced so that, the government has money in the future to
expend on resources to benefit the public in matters such as housing, education, and infrastructure.
Another perspective defines the public interest as, preserving land already dedicated to public housing
for that use and finding alternative ways of raising capital to pay down public debt. In this instance, the
ESCR Committee embraced the latter view in holding that the government failed to adequately value the
need for affordable and subsidized housing.
326. Id. para. 17.6.
327. The “public commons” refers to the collective resources designated for the public good and
placed in the care of government for that purpose.
328. Id. para. 15.3.
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that dwelling” without a proper hearing.329 Note that the homeowner can still
be dispossessed, but, prior to doing so, legitimate justifications must be
furnished in accordance with a legally-sanctioned procedure. The ECJ
decisions lay a foundation to intersect with the right to housing. The ESCR
Committee’s rulings, in part because they are framed as cases against the
sovereign state, impose obligations on the government. Nonetheless, they
implicate private actors because the government will need to craft laws and
regulations pertaining to housing transactions. The reframing on both fronts
pushes the private sphere of residential mortgage debt financing and rental
contracts towards the public sphere of the human right to housing. The ECJ’s
engagement by way of directives and the EU Charter is also a reminder of
the broader economic market. The costs exacted by unduly oppressive
private housing contracts and legal rules primarily structured to engender
profit-making at the expense of basic human interests have implications that
exceed domestic boundaries. The EU’s project of the integrated economic
market is undermined by market failure, which is evidenced by rampant
homelessness, poverty, over-indebtedness, and the widespread inability to
meet debt obligations on the part of individuals and government.330
Supranational courts provide forums in which the market interests of
stability, participation, efficiency, and coordination may intermingle with the
welfarist ideal of human flourishing.
The concepts of vulnerability and human dignity are also integral to this
changing paradigm narrative. Vulnerability has emerged as a term of

329. See Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 61
(Mar. 14, 2013).
330. Achieving consistency, translatability, and harmonization across markets are among the
paramount objectives of the EU Council. See Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach
to European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339 (1997) (discussing translatability in connection with
the Common Core Project and distinguishing between the Project and harmonization). Jan M. Smits, The
Principles of European Contract Law and the Harmonization of Private Law in Europe, in LA TERCERA
PARTE DE LOS PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO CONTRACTUAL EUROPEO, 567–90 (Antoni Vacquer ed., 2005);
Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence and Varieties of Capitalism
(ECGI, Law Working Paper No. 355/2017, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2977500.
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currency in international law.331 Cognizance of levels of vulnerability332
along gender lines, family,333 age, disability, and immigrant status334 is
apparent in the ECJ and the ESCR Committee decisions.335 Vulnerability’s
influence is reflected in the use of the term “weaker party” in both the private
and public law realms. Vulnerability may be defined in several ways.
Vulnerability refers to the existential condition, positioning, or status of the
individual that renders the person susceptible to tactics, practices, and
structures of institutions or others, causing detriment. The condition or status
of the person suggests that the individual is not functioning as an arms-length
bargainer. Rather, he or she is impaired in the ability to interact freely with
government, corporations, or other individuals. Individual autonomy is
compromised or nonexistent.336 Under the freedom of contract narrative,
individual private actors are framed as rational self-interested human beings
331. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Cantero Gamito, supra note 24, at 69. See, e.g., UNCONSCIONABILITY
EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE (Mel Kenny et al.
eds., 2010). Spain’s government uses the term “vulnerability” in two key national laws, Royal DecreeLaw 6/2012 and Royal Decree-Law 27/2012, adopted prior to the Aziz decision. The rapporteurs for the
Country Report on Spain propose that, in the absence of express language defining this concept, one can
nonetheless discern a sense of the meaning from the laws which suggest that aspects of vulnerability
include low income, poverty, lack of assets that may be dedicated to paying the mortgage obligation,
families under impending threat of foreclosure and eviction, and families with disabled members.
332. See MBD, supra note 57, para 15.2 (“[P]ay particular attention to evictions that involve women,
children, older persons with disabilities or other vulnerable individuals or groups who are subjected to
systemic discrimination.”).
333. See id. para. 17.7 (underscoring that it is “the State’s duty to grant the greatest and widest
possible protection to the family, as the foundation of society”).
334. Kothari, supra note 31. A substantial portion of the immigrant community has been impacted
negatively by bank foreclosures. See García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 44, 47.
335. The Aziz case involved an individual of Moroccan heritage, whose employment in Spain
commenced in December 1993. The case does not deal with ethnic discrimination; however, given the
history of discrimination in Spain against Africans and Muslims and his status as a minority, Mr. Aziz’s
ethnic background raises a question as to whether his heritage (and possibly his religion) factored into his
experience with Caixa. His story, combined with those of others explored in this paper, invites scrutiny
regarding the vulnerability of minority groups with respect to the predatory lending practices of banks.
While all groups without access to meaningful capital and influence suffer from the power differential
that exists between banks and the general public, there are certain groups that banks may more readily
target for burdensome and “unscrupulous” lending processes. Some troublesome actions include:
inadequate underwriting that approves individuals without adequate assets for loans, precluding
refinancing, precluding loan modifications, offering predatory mortgage loan types (e.g. adjustable rate
mortgages with “usurious” interest rates, and over-securitizing loans by requiring guarantors on
residential loans that the bank ordinarily would not insist upon, thereby exposing more than one property
owner to the risk of losing assets in the event of a default.
336. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 4 OSLO L. REV. 133,
133–49 (2017) (arguing that we are all vulnerable). It is important to note, however, that we are not all
equally vulnerable. For example, a study by Human Rights Watch identifies immigrants, single-mothers,
“single-parent households . . . women victims of economic abuse, and children” as being the most
vulnerable and as having suffered “disproportionate” harm related to Spain’s housing crisis. See
SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 29.
IN
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who should be left to their own resourcefulness to formulate contracts and
autonomously determine the contours of their existence in society.
Vulnerability theory offers an alternative to the private law autonomous
individual vision. Martha Fineman, one of the leading scholars in this area,
posits:
. . . [T]he institutions of particular interest are those that are created and
maintained under the legitimating authority of the state, since the ultimate
objective of vulnerability analysis is to argue that the state must be more
responsive to, and responsible for vulnerability.337

Although the ECJ does not always expressly use the term “vulnerable,”
it draws upon the logic of vulnerability theory in recognizing inequities in
the status and bargaining power of banks and mortgage consumers. Instead
of “vulnerable,” the ECJ refers to mortgage consumers as weaker parties.338
The analysis of whether the mortgage terms are unfair is framed in terms of:
(i) whether a reasonable person would have accepted the contract; (ii)
whether the consumer had any flexibility with respect to the non-negotiated
terms; and (iii) whether the contract terms were written in intelligible
language.339 Translated into the lexicon of vulnerability, one would inquire
about the effect of the contractual terms and the mortgage process on
borrowers who may be vulnerable because of their experience or economic
circumstances.340 The ESCR Committee uses the term “vulnerable” in
matters concerning residential mortgage loans and rental housing.341
Vulnerability, in this context, involves being “subjected to systemic
discrimination.”342 Systemic discrimination indicates that the government is
unresponsive to the plight of individuals who are in need of services,
resources, and protective mechanisms in order to live in dignity.
Complainant IDG characterized herself as being in a position of
“vulnerability, uncertainty, and anxiety” as a result of her financial
institution availing itself of national procedural rules that favored lenders.343

337. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 13 (2008). I draw a distinction between Fineman’s theory and
my own in that I recognize that the world is not in a post-identity moment and the utility of strategically
claiming identity-positions has not been exhausted, particularly when individuals are routinely identified,
engaged, and penalized.
338. Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, 2016
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154, ¶ 56 (Dec. 21, 2016).
339. Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 3–4, 69
(Mar. 14, 2013).
340. For example, potential borrowers may be in need of capital, but their credit rating impairs their
ability to bargain over loan contract terms.
341. MBD, supra note 57, para. 21(c).
342. Id. para. 15.2.
343. IDG, supra note 278, para. 10.2.
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In MBD, the UN Committee directs states to “ensure that evicted persons
have alternative housing, especially in cases involving families, older
persons, children and/or other persons in vulnerable situations.”344 Usage of
the term “vulnerability” is a nod towards representing the particular
experiential aspects of a person’s existence which render him susceptible to
harm from the blanket application of private adhesion contracts or public
policies weighted in favor of businesses. It reflects a human rights
sensibility. Human rights law allows for broader inquiry than the question of
whether a contract is unconscionable.
The foregoing discussion analyzes how the reframing of housing
markets has unfolded. It explores the emergence of a paradigmatic shift from
siloed private and public law regimes to one incorporating both. It also
highlights some of the positive attributes of the new approach. In the section
that follows, I intervene in the central debate between public and private law
scholars regarding the intermingling of these two legal terrains.
VI. DEBATING THE TERRAINS OF PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE
LAW
A. The Public-Private Law Debate
There is an emerging scholarly debate regarding the extent to which
public law principles should be enfolded into private law.345 European
private law stalwarts express numerous concerns aimed at maintaining
doctrinal boundaries. Public law advocates focus on the historical shortfalls
of European Union law in not giving sufficient prominence to social justice
objectives. Another approach—which this Article advocates—is a way of
conceptualizing what is occurring and what is necessary to accomplish
essential objectives of both camps.
Progress towards a rethinking of private and public law in the European
context has been fraught with difficulty.346 A vocal contingent, of dominant
market actors (e.g., banks, real estate entities, landlords, government) and
private law scholars, have greeted the softening of boundaries between
private and public law with apprehension.347 First, the critics maintain that
344. MBD, supra note 57, para. 21(c).
345. See, e.g., Hugh Collins, Private Law, Fundamental Rights, and the Rule of Law, 121 W. VA. L.
REV. 1 (2018); Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The Call
for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006).
346. Taking into account the move towards the “constitutionalization of private law” in the United
States and foreign jurisdictions, Hugh Collins analyzes and counters several main arguments against the
intermixing of private and public law. See Collins, supra note 345, at 12–20.
347. See id. (articulating a critical treatment of the central arguments); see also Michel Rosenfeld,
Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty First Century: An
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the juridical-legislative move threatens freedom of contract.348 They argue
that parties should be left to engage in the evaluative process of assessing
risk, bargaining, and the structuring of their own deals as they see fit.
International courts and conventions add new risks. Privately negotiated
contracts will be remade in a way that the parties didn’t contemplate. The
blending of public and private is, initially, likely to weigh more heavily
against corporate actors. Rather than achieving more equality in the market,
substantial incursions into private contracting will seriously debilitate
businesses, which will ultimately hurt the economy and individuals, from a
trickle-down perspective. Higher transaction costs will be passed on to
consumers. Access to credit will be decreased because either lenders will
conclude that their estimated profit margin on certain loans will be
insufficient or consumers will decide that the loans are cost prohibitive.
Second, staunch private law supporters have lamented that incorporating
public law principles undermines private law’s ability to resolve issues
concerning housing contracts.349 They argue that the blurring of regimes
creates confusion and deprives actors from shaping the rules, laws, and
practices that govern transactions. Excessive mixing of the terrains of private
and public law dilutes carefully developed private law principles.350 Private
law furnishes the expertise and detail necessary to manage the intricacies of
the various deals at issue. When the overlay of international human rights
ideals is added, it threatens the carefully worked out rules and the individual
freedom to assess risk and formulate contracts. Olha Cherednychenko, along

Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–28 (2013) (discussing the traditional divide between public
law and private law).
348. See Jürgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The Making of a
Hybrid, 9 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 35 (2001); Mattei & Nicola, supra note 345, at 17 (discussing Jürgen
Baseow’s arguments expressed in his article, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The
Making of a Hybrid regarding the relevance of freedom of contact and its importance to the anchoring of
the EU).
349. Recent literature has noted the intersection between private corporate behavior and public
human rights. Olha Cherednychenko comments:
[I]n German law in particular, there has been a noticeable change in the extent to which
fundamental rights, i.e. human rights embodied in international human rights treaties and
constitutional rights enshrined in national constitutions, have begun to have an impact on the
relationships between private parties under contract law, i.e. a horizontal effect in contract law.
Olha O. Cherednychenko, Conceptualising Unconscionability in the Context of Risky Financial
Transactions: How to Converge Public and Private Law Approaches?, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN
EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, supra note 331, at 247. See Michel Rosenfeld,
Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty First Century: An
Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–28 (2013) (noting the existence of the debate).
350. See generally Cherednychenko, supra note 349 (analyzing the interplay of public and private
law in the context of unconscionability in financial transactions).
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with other private law scholars, argues that private law is enough.351 She
maintains that by resorting to a combination of private law norms and
European private law regulatory business conduct rules,352 enacted at the
supranational level,353 sufficient protection for consumers can be achieved
without diminishing the authority of the private law regime.354 Third, the
skeptics argue that what is offered in place of contract law’s clearly defined
rules and doctrines are muddied and ill-defined ad hoc approaches that lead
to uncertainty and inconsistency in judicial outcomes.355
On the other side of the debate are public law advocates who champion
the relevance of human rights to all sectors of life, including private
ordering.356 Legal professionals, such as judges and experts on the ECtHR
or the ESCR Committee, are included within this group. They recognize the
values expressed in the international instruments they are responsible for
interpreting and are committed to the ideal of human rights. There are also
advocates who work in organizations dedicated to advancing human rights
and human rights scholars within the academy. Their arguments fall along a
spectrum. Some recognize that given the human rights international
conventions in place,357 adherence is required in order to be in compliance
351. According to Cherednychenko, German contract law contains within it “general legal concepts
such as good faith, good morals or public policy, defects of consent” that could operate to address
inequalities in contractual agreements that ultimately harm the weaker party. Id. at 258–59.
352. See, e.g., Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts., Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011); Eur. Ass’n of Consumers and the Eur. Credit Sector
Ass’ns [ECSAs], European Agreement on a Voluntary code of Conduct on Pre-Contractual Information
on Home Loans, https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/051-private-act.pdf (last
visited Jan. 1, 2021).
353. Examples of supranational business conduct rules include: Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive and the Investment Services Directive. See Cherednychenko, supra note 349, at 262–74.
354. Cherednychenko observes that because private law has developed important standards and
practices over time, “[f]undamental rights . . . do not add anything substantially new to possible ways of
resolving . . . [how to achieve the proper balance between freedom of contract and protecting the weaker
party], and also do not provide any workable criteria for providing new answers.” Id. at 259. She
recognizes that while “fundamental rights are an important source of core values for the whole legal order;
contract law as the source of concepts provid[es] much sharper criteria developed by trial and error over
a long period of time for determining whether a particular contract is unconscionable.” Id. at 260.
355. For an analysis of the differing paths of development of the international human rights regime
and international private law, see Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law
Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 247–50 (2015). Dubinsky argues that the
international human rights regime was late to directly engage projects of international private law, which
has exacerbated their incongruence and has created issues concerning bringing the two regimes together.
See Mattei & Nicola, supra note 348, at 17 (discussing Baseow’s emphasis on the relevance of freedom
of contact and its importance to the anchoring of the EU).
356. Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 269, 269
(2014).
357. E.g., EU Charter, supra note 81, arts. 1–54; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec
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with treaty obligations. Depending upon the overall objectives of the legal
regime, human rights principles are necessary to fulfill those goals.358 Still
other scholars have made a pitch for adopting vulnerability as a normative
standard in the arena of consumer law359 in contrast to a purely freedom of
contract model. There are scholars who have pushed the envelope in
exploring whether European private law can truly implement a “progressive
agenda” more responsive to social needs.360 Ugo Mattei and Fernanda
Nicola, for example, have argued that social justice goals are muted when
European Union rules and regulations are constructed solely to serve the
economic market.361 One way of guarding against this narrow conception of
European private law is to be cognizant of the role of ideology and politics.362
Although this Article does not explicitly take up the critique of Mattei and
Nicola, their position is an important one to bear in mind if one seeks to hold
law accountable to humanity’s needs.
1. Private Law Housing Markets Should Not be Left to SelfRegulation
This subsection develops the argument that the private sector cannot be
trusted to self-regulate. Adopting a purely private law framework to resolve
the underlying issues in Aziz, Naranjo, Hidalgo, Morcillo, Kušinova, IDG,
and MBD, for example, leaves aspects of the claims presented
unaddressed.363 State regulation is needed when the objectives include
16, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
358. Ondersma, supra note 356.
359. Irina Domurath, The Case for Vulnerability as the Normative Standard in European Consumer
Credit and Mortgage Law—An Inquiry into the Paradigms of Consumer Law, 3 J. EUR. CONSUMER &
MKT. L. 124 (2013). See generally Cherednychenko, supra note 349 (stressing the importance that private
law develop concepts for protecting the vulnerable against unconscionable financial transactions).
360. Mattei & Nicola, supra note 345.
361. Mattei and Nicola are skeptical of the possibility of transforming European Law to implement
a truly radical progressive agenda. They argue:
While the targets are the Members States’ legal systems, with their incremental development
of institutional systems of ‘social’ private law (protective formalism, mandatory law, notarized
acts, and measures of contractual justice such as the broad use of ‘unconscionability’ or ‘good
faith’), the means are the creation of another industry, the so-called ‘new’ European private
law. Because the transformation of scholarly movements into industries precludes critical
thinking, the consequence of this move is the incapacity to set an independent agenda and the
desire to follow that of corporate-captured Brussels, in the hope of obtaining funding and
prestige.
Id. at 30.
362. Id. at 4.
363. For discussions on potential gaps in consumer protection when the private law regime is
charged with the role of handling matters such as residential mortgage loans, Chrystin Ondersma’s work
is insightful. She advocates fully embracing human rights principles to enrich private law concepts and
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protecting individuals in their claims to maintain property ownership,
stabilizing their tenure as tenants, or securing a hearing on the fairness of
their contractual terms. Beginning with the arguments of European private
law scholars, this section notes that the arguments are well-taken, but do not
persuasively establish that public law principles should be partitioned off
from the conceptualization and administration of private law matters.
The work of scholars, practitioners, the judiciary, and private
businesses in defining private law mechanisms to resolve disputes and
establish remedies means that there are nuanced approaches to contractual
issues. There are well-settled understandings of terms and concepts that one
should not undo by an unthoughtful resort to public human rights law in the
effort to provide relief to consumers. Yet for all the sophistication and detail
that define the private law sphere, there are gaps. It is unlikely that the
stronger parties in private law transactions are inclined to develop efficacious
mechanisms to protect vulnerable parties. Thus, in response to the freedom
of contract argument, one must query how much freedom individuals
typically have in their interactions with corporate or government entities
when attempting to secure the basic human staple of housing. Freedom of
contract should not translate into the freedom of a powerful party to take
advantage of a vulnerable party. In the absence of sufficient protection, the
balance is too far weighted in favor of businesses to the repeated detriment
of consumers. Without the imposition of external restraints (e.g., human
rights obligations, supranational courts), incentives, and obligations, even
rationally acting businesses may be shortsighted in assessing their interests
and may not operate in a way that contributes to healthy economies overall
within the EU. Private law interests, or even state-defined economic
interests, are not always in sync with international human rights concerns.
That disjuncture may dissuade dominant private actors from incorporating
human rights considerations into their transactions. In contrast to public
human rights, lender and landlord private actors will operate in their interests
even if those actions are pernicious to other contractual parties.
2. Public Law Adds Value and Positively Impacts the Housing
Markets That Private Law Operates by Stabilizing Outcomes and Clarifying
Objectives
In addressing the concern that public law dilutes private law and creates
legal uncertainty, it is necessary to consider: (i) the manner in which
concepts such as unconscionability and good faith operate in European
improve the resolution of private law matters from the standpoint of consumer protection. Chrystin D.
Ondersma, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, 90 TUL. L. REV. 373, 391 (2015); see also,
Ondersma, supra note 356.
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housing markets and (ii) how supranational courts and legal instruments
have incorporated human rights principles. Although there have been some
challenges to addressing inequalities in housing contracts, the worst fears of
private law scholars are unfounded. The UCT Directive formalizes a vision
of consumer transactions in which there are power imbalances between seller
(the stronger party) and consumer (the weaker party), and in which necessary
external mechanisms (e.g., the courts, regulating bodies, legislation) exist to
correct the imbalances and infuse equity into the transaction. Within the
European Union, there has long been consensus that some protection of
consumers is warranted.364 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz comment:
The view that general terms of business must be controlled in
order to protect the weak and uninitiated against those with practiced
power has proved enormously effective in discussions of legal policy.
This slogan was embraced by the modern consumer movement and
since the beginning of the 1960s the laws enacted by most European
countries have been more or less based on the view that the consumer
as the ‘weaker’ party must be protected against contractual terms
which entrepreneurs force on him by abusing their economic
superiority.365

Private contract law has doctrinal principles that are intended to offer
protection to parties under certain circumstances. Mistake, fraud, deceit,
duress, impossibility, frustration of purpose, illegality, undue influence, and
unconscionability are all concepts that may be drawn upon to provide relief.
In exploring the protection that unconscionability lends, it is necessary to
consider its scope, its purpose, and whether it accomplishes normatively
what this Article proposes. In other words, does unconscionability furnish
sufficient protection and support for housing consumers? Does the concept
adequately restrain residential lenders and landlords in their contracts with
consumers?366 Does the concept offer any protections for the homeless or
those experiencing housing insecurity? Unconscionability is a viable, but
incompletely formed doctrine.367 European legal scholars have documented
364. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, The Function and Aims of Comparative Law, in FREEDOM
Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
365. Id.
366. Jacob Hale Russell offers compelling arguments which maintain that unconscionability is
expansive enough to provide such protection in the U.S. context. Hale specifically notes the direct
influence of the doctrine on the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act. Jacob Hale
Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 983–84 (2019).
367. This is true in Europe and the United States. In the United States, the Uniform Commercial
Code, which applies to commercial transactions, incorporates the doctrines of unconscionability and good
faith. See U.C.C. §§ 1-304 (good faith), 2-302 (unconscionability) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1951). For a development of the discussion of these concepts in connection with the U.C.C.,
see Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug
OF CONTRACT AND ITS LIMITS 330 (Tony
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that unconscionability continues to operate in different legal circumstances
and jurisdictions.368 However, there is no singular definitive test to mark
unconscionability, although consumer directives like the UCT provide
guidance. The actions or inactions of contractual parties may produce an
unconscionable contract. As discussed below, a court may determine that a
contract is unconscionable because good faith was lacking in its formation.
This determination may involve a test that is construed differently or
inconsistently across jurisdictions.

of War Continues, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 647 (2009); see also, Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of
Unconscionability as the ‘Law of the Poor,’ 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014). Courts have interpreted section
2-302 of the U.C.C. as pertaining to all types of contracts including those of mortgage loans. Kathleen C.
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (scoping out the terrain of approaches for addressing predatory lending in the
U.S., evaluating them, and highlighting remaining gaps in the regulatory framework); see also, Richard
Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent, and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
An obvious omission from the U.C.C. provisions is a definition of “unconscionability.” Thus, even
though a United States court may act upon it when it decides unconscionability is present, there is no
guided process in the U.C.C. for making the determination. Instead, the section permits parties to present
evidence of unconscionability. Section 208 of the Restatement of Contracts also addresses
unconscionability and states, “[i]f a contract or a term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract
is made, a court may refuse to enforce the contract or may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable term.” Further, Section 5 of the proposed new Restatement on Consumer Contracts
offers, “a term is unconscionable if it is (1) substantively unconscionable, namely fundamentally unfair
or unreasonably one-sided, and (2) procedurally unconscionable . . . .” The detail of when a party
transgresses those definitions is left to the courts, but the proposed Restatement requires a party to
demonstrate substantive and procedural unconscionability, which is a demanding burden to meet. Two
notable American cases that wrestle with defining unconscionability are Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897
N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008). Notwithstanding the absence of a definition, the significance of the doctrine
being codified in the U.C.C. should not be overlooked. Borrowers and other consumers in the United
States continue to draw upon the unconscionability defense, with mixed success, in seeking relief and
protection from burdensome and predatory contracts and practices. See, e.g., McFarland v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 810 F.3d 273, 284–86 (4th Cir. 2016) (awarding summary judgment to the bank and holding that
plaintiff’s claim that his contract was unconscionable when entered could not succeed even accepting his
allegations regarding the bargaining process as true and remanding on the unconscionable inducement
claim). But see New Mexico ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670 (N.M. 2014)
(“Installment loans bearing interest rates of 1,147.14% to 1,500.00% are substantively unconscionable
under common law and the UPA [Unfair Practices Act].”). Legal scholar Jacob Hale Russell provides
persuasive evidence that following the global economic crisis of 2008, consumer’s claims of substantive
unconscionability have been more successful than in prior years. Russell, supra note 366, at 1018.
368. Mel Kenny et al., Conceptualising Unconscionability in Europe: In the Kaleidoscope of Private
and Public Law, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE, supra note 331, at 377–99. American law scholars, such as Anne
Fleming and Jacob Hale Russell, separately, have argued that the doctrine of unconscionability continues
to be applied in different ways, including in codified forms such as the U.C.C., consumer legislation
enacted by Congress and state legislatures, and in state court decisions. Fleming, supra note 367, at 1388,
1391, 1436; Russell, supra note 366, at 977–78.
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Unconscionability is an equitable doctrine, deriving from the common
law, that may intervene to restrict the enforcement of a private contract.369
The potential of unconscionability is tempered by freedom of contract
norms.370 European and American courts rely upon the doctrine to address
contractual inequality.371 In the European context, unconscionability is a
legal invention that operates in conjunction with the international law
principle of pacta sunt servanda.372 The principle mandates that “agreements
which are legally binding must be performed.”373 Unconscionability allows
for the possibility that a contract may be nullified or modified where there
are contractual formation or substantive term issues. Without the
unconscionability doctrine, private parties would be left to their own devices
in structuring agreements. There would be no restrictions on the enforcement
of the agreements formed, even if they had extremely harsh consequences
for the consumer, as long as they were lawful.
Unconscionability, unfairness, and good faith are interrelated concepts
that inform the UCT Directive and the ECJ cases analyzed herein. While the
ECJ does not expressly use the term “unconscionability,” its influence is
apparent. Good faith, fairness, and unfairness are expressly referenced in the
Directive.374 All bear on the matter of unconscionability. The 93/13 Directive
defines “unfairness” primarily by furnishing an inchoate list of unfair terms
and scenarios under which unfairness arises. Integral to the assessment of a

369. Immaculada Barral-Viñais, Freedom of Contract, Unequal Bargaining Power and Consumer
Law on Unconscionability, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 331, at 46.
370. Freedom of contract is predicated on the idea that individuals are autonomous rational beings.
See, e.g., THOMAS GUTMANN, THEORIES OF CONTRACT AND THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY (2013);
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Autonomy for Contract, Refined (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper,
Paper No. 14-598, 2018); Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law
(Theory), 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (2013).
371. Camilo A. Rodriguez-Yong, The Doctrines of Unconscionability and Abusive Clauses: A
Common Point Between Civil and Common Law Legal Traditions, OXFORD U COMP. L. F. 1, 5 (2011);
Fleming, supra note 367; Russell, supra note 366. To be clear, I argue that the concept of
unconscionability is operative in European and American law; however, the doctrine may be expressed
differently depending upon the context. For example, European courts may refer to “unfairness” or “the
doctrine of abusive clauses.” Regardless of the name, these concepts have the common purpose of
furnishing a legal basis for nullifying or reforming contracts.
372. Cherednychenko defines “an unconscionable financial transaction” as “a bargain which is
(potentially) excessively disadvantageous for the weaker party whose freedom to form an independent
judgement about the merits of the contract at the time the contract was made has been impaired because
of what the stronger party has done or omitted to do.” Cherednychenko, supra note 349, at 248.
373. Pacta Sunt Servanda, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); BarralViñais, supra note 369, at 47.
374. See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, arts. 1–3.
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term’s unfairness is whether the parties were acting in good faith.375 The
Directive Preamble provides:
whereas in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be
had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the
consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods
and services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer;
whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or
supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose
legitimate interests he has to take into account.376

Based upon the foregoing, the ECJ articulated a good faith test in Aziz.
The test is applicable to the terms of the mortgage contract and probes
whether “the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the
consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to
the term concerned in individual contract negotiations.”377
In connection with the good faith test, I have three points. First, given
the goals of obtaining uniformity, stability, and broad participation in
housing markets across jurisdictions, it is necessary to contemplate rules of
participation and to adopt a legal framework that helps facilitate those goals.
One may count good faith and fairness amongst those rules. Second, while
it is difficult to properly structure an intervening mechanism to judicially
review disputed contracts, as the Aziz good faith test illustrates, the test is
aimed at clarifying rather than diluting an already sufficiently developed
term. Whereas an unrestrained private contract environment might define
terms identified in the annex to the UCT Directive as within the bounds of
good faith, the Directive makes clear that they are not. The annex terms and
scenarios are influenced by notions of fairness deriving in part from human
rights principles. Third, tests like the one articulated in Aziz are intended to
provide a framework for evaluating whether good faith and fairness (i.e.,
consideration of the circumstances of the less economically powerful party)
are reflected in the agreement. While initial attempts to apply the standard
may be awkward, courts should become more adept at application with each
case. One can read the Aziz test as the ECJ’s effort to provide detail to help
guide the evaluative moment. The test signals to lenders (and other suppliers)
that in order to survive judicial scrutiny they must at least take into account
the party they are entering into a relationship with, and not structure the deal
in a way that essentially ensures that the consumer-borrower will fail in
meeting his contractual obligations. In the future, it will be interesting to

375. See id.
376. Id., pmbl., at 1.
377. Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415 ¶ 69 (Mar.
14, 2013).
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examine to what extent the test helps to curtail predatory lending.378 Ideally,
the test reflects back on lenders, in the substance of the contracts they
prepare, and on governments in terms of the civil procedures they have in
place for the adjudication of contract disputes.
3. The ECJ’s Good Faith Test in Operation
Now, taking a closer look at how the ECJ’s good faith test may be
applied, the following discussion highlights some issues. The ECJ structures
the test by weighting both the seller and the consumer positions. The seller
must be fair and even-handed. The consumer must be a reasonable actor in
determining whether to enter into the contract or agree to the terms under
scrutiny. One wrinkle in this proposed mechanism is that it is difficult to
imagine that if borrowers understood the full import of the unfavorable terms
in their loan contracts, they would agree to them, unless they were desperate.
If they were desperate, it raises the question of whether they should have
been permitted to enter into the contract in the first place because
desperation, arguably, may be construed as a sign of duress.
While the test is potentially beneficial to mortgage consumers, it is not
easily administered. Applying the test requires the court to conjure up an
imagined space in which both actors in the pre-contract “negotiation” are
assessed.379 The test is likely to allow for invalidation of terms where the
lender hid them from borrowers (e.g., presented them in small type or buried
them in footnotes) or presented them in legalese essentially inscrutable for
many consumers. However, the test does not remove the lender’s interest
from the equation. That is, it requires courts to assess the lender’s behavior
for whether it meets the fair and equitable standard. It then asks courts to
stand in the shoes of the fair and equitable lender and draw conclusions as to
the kind of terms a consumer would agree to.380

378. While the definition of “predatory loan” has been the subject of much debate, Kathleen Engel
and Patricia McCoy offer a useful way of thinking about this type of contract as exhibiting certain
markers. In their words, such contracts are designed “to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers.” Engel & McCoy, supra note 367, at 1260–61.
379. The word “negotiation” is placed in quotes to reflect that the parties in the residential mortgage
loan contract are often not engaged in the level of bargaining suggested by the use of the term. Typically,
the lender or mortgage broker presents the contract, and the potential borrower must decide whether to
sign it.
380. It is necessary to ask, “What would inform this assessment?” The court could: examine past
behavior of consumers; base its determination on empirical studies of consumers regarding the kind of
basic terms they would accept and the penalties to which they would not want to be subjected; make an
arbitrary determination of what consumers should not agree to; or balance between a “reasonable” amount
of profit a lender should be able to make on a residential mortgage loan transaction, as compared to the
hardship the borrower would suffer if the contract is enforced without modification.
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4. Resulting Norms and Standards
Despite the difficulties, deploying a test to assess the absence of good
faith as a sign of unconscionability is an imperfect but useful approach to
producing housing contracts that are more equitable and reflective of human
rights values. Aziz demonstrates the challenge of devising a workable test. It
also suggests that more is needed so that substantive fairness in private
housing contracts and the public’s indispensable interest in housing can be
achieved. Private law actors contribute to the process of devising norms and
standards. The difference, under the new paradigm, is that the actions of the
dominant participant are subject to considerations of the weaker party.
Private law precepts alone, such as freedom of contract, fail to protect weaker
parties.381
The “more” requires drawing upon human rights principles. Human
rights ideals regarding dignity and the significance of the home (rented or
owned) to one’s psychological and overall well-being are substantive content
that can help fill up the concept of unconscionability when courts are
prevailed upon to evaluate housing contracts.382 Human dignity speaks more
broadly to the constitution of the individual who is to be accorded respect, a
basic level of treatment, and privacy, merely because of the individual’s
status as a human being. The focus on dignity requires a reorientation
towards the transaction. Normatively, dignity extends to individuals certain
protections in their person and in how they live. It places obligations and
restrictions on the state and others. Although dignity itself requires further
definition,383 including dignity as a principle changes the frame to be used
for the evaluation of whether a contract is so unduly weighted in favor of one
party that it must be deemed unconscionable.
With respect to the arguments of public law scholars, the shift towards
more equitable contracts, even though characterized by an emphasis on
procedural fairness at the supranational level, is noteworthy. Their concern,
which I share, is that procedural equality will function as a protective shield

381. I share Joseph Singer’s conclusion:
The American ideals of equality and liberty require laws that regulate market transactions to
ensure that we are free from unfair practices and that our economic system is not periodically
threatened by the negligent creation of toxic assets. Such regulations do not take away our
liberty; they promote liberty. Such regulations do not treat us unequally by giving special
protection to the weak; they ensure that we enter the marketplace on equal terms and that we
can expect the same treatment that others would want for themselves and their family members.
Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 HARV. CR.-C.L.
L. REV. 141, 167 (2012).
382. Human dignity is a foundational concept for international human rights. The first chapter of the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights is titled “Dignity.” EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 1.
383. See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 655 (2008).
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for businesses and governments, representing an acceptable limit on what is
required of businesses and government in their interactions with individuals.
The degree to which new laws and rules on housing transactions translate
into meaningful change will depend on several factors. It is necessary to
monitor whether individuals attain substantial relief from oppressive
contractual situations. National courts must adhere to the mandate to remove
unfair terms from residential mortgage and rental contracts. Lenders and
landlords must be incentivized to write transactional documents in ways that
meet the requisites of good faith and conscionability. Lastly, governments
must protect their constituents and satisfy their fundamental need for
housing.
VII. PROGRESS FOR HOUSING CONSUMERS
Deep reflections on the meaning of fairness and substantive equality are
blossoming in human rights sectors384 and juridical dialogue.385 Shifts in the
framing of housing are occurring at the municipal, national, and international
levels. While enshrining the right to housing is a fundamental step, other
legal mechanisms are required for the right to be realized. More specifically,
protecting individuals in relation to their housing interests requires an
approach that contemplates both human rights values and private law
concepts. According to one study, approximately “ten percent of the total
population, and twenty-three percent of the households at risk of poverty
(with an income below sixty percent of the median), in the European Union
struggle with rent arrears or mortgage payments.”386 The centrality of
housing to the human experience weighs in favor of investing the concepts
of good faith and unconscionability with the human rights principles of
dignity, compassion, and vulnerability.387 The failure to include a broader,
384. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights issued an opinion paper advocating a
broad interpretation of the right to housing. See Council of Europe, Comm’r for Human Rts. [CoE],
Housing Rights: The Duty to Ensure Housing for All, at 1, U.N. Doc. CommDH/IssuePaper(2008)1 (Apr.
25, 2008).
385. Courts can coordinate the mixing of concepts from the two regimes when neither offers a
sufficient answer. If reasonableness is usually determined according to industry standards, an application
of that norm will likely result in more wins for the seller and less protection for the consumer. In contrast,
if what is reasonable is viewed from the standpoint of the consumer, then the court must devote more
attention to the consumer’s knowledge and positionality.
386. Anna Kahlmeter et al., Housing Evictions and Economic Hardship: A Prospective Study, 34
EUR. SOC. REV. 106, 106 (2018).
387. Sweden offers an approach permitting the state to intervene heavily in affairs of private law
with socio-economic policies subsidizing housing. Empiricists Anna Kahlmeter, Olof Bäckman, and Lars
Bränström conclude that, “while many European countries were hit hard by the [2007-2010 economic]
crises, the consequences in Sweden . . . were comparatively moderate, and there was in fact no increase
in the number of executed evictions in the aftermath of the crises.” Id. As an EU Member, Sweden is
subject to the UCT Directive. See Case C-468/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Sweden,
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human-rights informed concept of unconscionability into the calculus
operates to extend the precariat class of home owners and renters, leaving
them in a vulnerable position.388 Furthermore, focusing only on reforming
mortgage instruments fails to adequately attend to the needs of property users
who are not owners in a traditional sense, like those in need of subsidized or
low-income rental housing.389
Scrutinizing the subject matter of new legislation issued by Spain’s
government and by EU institutions at the supranational level is one way to
detect whether a cross-pollination of the efficiency incentives of private
markets and public redistribution goals is occurring. In the aftermath of the
2008 economic crisis, the Spanish government responded to local and
international political pressure by crafting several measures revising
procedures related to mortgage contracts and protections for debtors, along
with paths for eliminating their debt.390 Spain’s mortgage law, which came
into effect on March 16, 2019,391 is a recent example. The law addresses the
interest rate floor clause that the ECJ tackled in Naranjo and adds other
protections for consumers such as building in time for review of the
mortgage contract, requiring a notary to participate in contract review prior
to signing, and restrictions on when banks may foreclose and evict.392 At the
transnational level, the Mortgage Credit Directive, 2014/17/EU, which, inter
alia, imposes disclosure and underwriting requirements on lenders, is an
important addition to the consumer protection arsenal.393
2002 E.C.R. I-04147 (May 7, 2002) (challenging whether Sweden satisfied the requirements of the UCT
Directive by not making the non-exhaustive list of terms appended to the UCT Directive available to the
public, and holding that Sweden was not in violation of the Directive on this point).
388. See Margaret Radin’s caution against approaching the world solely in terms of commodification
and failing to appreciate human relationships and concerns. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). Acting in the latter manner, begs the question: what is property for? Id.
389. Some scholars, such as David Super, have proposed expanding notions of property to
encapsulate the interests of those who are usually viewed as non-owners. See David A. Super, A New
New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773 (2013).
390. Spain adopted several transitional laws under the encompassing Law 1/2013. These laws were
challenged on a piecemeal basis in separate requests to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. See, e.g., Case
C-8/14, BBVA SA v Peñalva López, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62014CC0008 (Oct. 29, 2015)
(responding to a request for a preliminary ruling on the Fourth Transitional Law of 1/2013 setting a time
period for challenging mortgage enforcement proceedings, and holding that the law was in violation of
the UCT Directive).
391. Ley 5/2019, de 16 de Marzo, reguladora de los contratos de crédito inmobiliario (B.O.E. 2019,
3814) (Spain).
392. Some of the mortgage law changes were prompted by the EU Mortgage Credit Directive.
Council Directive 2014/17/EU, supra note 87, para. 34.
393. Id.; Mortgage Credit, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/
banking-and-finance/consumer-finance-and-payments/retail-financial-services/credit/mortgagecredit_en (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) (“The [Mortgage Credit Directive] applies to all loans made to
consumers for the purpose of buying residential property.”).
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Spain also revisited domestic practices that contributed to the housing
insecurity of renters. As a result, Spain’s government issued a series of
decrees impacting Spain’s Tenancy Act394 and portions of the Civil Code
pertaining to rental agreements. These new laws target the primary concerns
of renters such as longer rental terms, limiting the rental renewal rate by
pegging it to the Consumer Price Index, and a requirement to notify the
appropriate government entities in conjunction with evictions.395 Barcelona,
one of Spain’s major cities, has begun levying extraordinary fines on
landlords who permit their buildings to remain vacant for extensive periods
of time while the city is suffering from a shortage of social housing.396 The
city has also been repurposing vacant houses to fulfill social housing
needs.397 Spain has adopted policies intended to address homelessness such
as the State Housing Plan (2018–2021)398 and the Comprehensive National
Homelessness Strategy (2015-2020).399 The back and forth involving the
issuance of decrees, congressional ratification or repeal,400 and court
challenges at the local and supranational levels, regarding whether the laws
conform to human rights obligations and EU directives, are all testaments to
the iterative nature of the process leading to the emergence of the new publicprivate law paradigm. Although Spain’s steps are inchoate and
insufficient,401 they are nonetheless illustrative of the government acting to
394. In Spanish, the Tenancy Act is known as Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos (LAU). Ley de
Arrendamientos Urbanos (B.O.E. 1994, 282), amended by (B.O.E. 2019) (Spain).
395. José Luis Aranda & José Marcos, Spain Introduces New Rental Rules with More Safeguards
for Tenants, EL PAÍS (Mar. 6, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/04/
inenglish/1551692513_394392.html.
396. Notably, Ada Colau, a former PAH activist, is the mayor imposing the Barcelona fines. The
monetary penalties are meant to punish and incentivize the investment companies who have opted to hold
their properties vacant until the housing market improves or direct them towards more lucrative uses. See
Feargus O’Sullivan, In Need of Housing, Barcelona Fines Landlords for Long-Vacant Buildings,
BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Mar. 15, 2019, 10:20 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/barcelonaaffordable-housing-spain-apartment-rental-fines/584902/.
397. Id.
398. See ANA ARRIBA & GREGORIO RODRÍGUEZ CABRERO, HOUSING PLAN IN SPAIN FOR 20182021: ESPN FLASH REPORT 2018/58 (2018) (giving overview of the plan).
399. See GREGORIO RODRÍGUEZ CABRERO & VICENTE MARBÁN GALLEGO, SPAIN’S FIRST
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL HOMELESSNESS STRATEGY: ESPN FLASH REPORT 2016/25 (2016) (stating
the Spanish Government adopted the Comprehensive National Homelessness Strategy 2015–2020 on
November 6, 2015).
400. Royal decrees are subject to approval by Congress. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n.
311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
401. While Spain has taken encouraging steps in the direction of protecting renters, there are glaring
omissions. High rental rates continue to cripple the overall well-being of the country. Contributors to the
high rent include speculation, Airbnb rentals, and the lack of a sufficient supply of low-income and social
housing. Even though rent levels are spiraling out of the affordability range for the average rental housing
consumer, the government has struggled to adequately address this issue. Ana Garcia Valdivia, Rising
Rents in Spain Threaten Low-Income Households, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:43 AM),
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devise regulations to render private law contracts more conscious of public
values and interests.
While there has been progress in the mortgage law area from the
standpoint of consumer protections,402 space remains for expanding the
protective net. One positive change is the voluntary pledge of some lending
institutions to abide by the “European Agreement on a Voluntary Code of
Conduct on Pre-Contractual Information for Home Loans.”403 This measure
is aimed at rebalancing the existing asymmetries in information between
banks and borrowers. Notwithstanding promising aspects of the code,
because it is voluntary, it does not provide oversight or enforcement, and
does not offer comprehensive protections for all stages of the financing
contract; it is insufficient to achieve uniform extensive protection for
“weaker” contractual parties. For the most part, Spanish banks have
interposed roadblocks to progress. For example, they have largely been
resistant to a remedy for mortgage borrowers that would allow them to
emerge from debt following a default.404 The procedure, known as datio in
solutum (dación en pago), essentially equates to a deed in lieu of foreclosure
in the United States. In accordance with the procedure, the foreclosing bank
accepts the deed and property in exchange for releasing the borrower from
his debt obligation. The historical resistance of Spanish banks to accepting
the collateral property in full satisfaction of the debt is indicative of the clash
between socio-cultural conceptions of the home and conceptions emanating
from the private sector and, sometimes, government. Individual homeowners
and renters focus on aspects of housing related to dignity: the home is a place
to live, raise their families, and accumulate wealth to ensure their financial

https://www.forbes.com/sites/anagarciavaldivia/2019/08/08/historic-highs-in-the-rental-market-inspain-threaten-low-income-households/#730627d21c0c; Todd White, Spain is Latest Battleground for
Global Affordable Housing, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-06-19/spain-is-latest-battleground-in-global-affordable -housing-fight.
402. For example, the bank can no longer acquire the foreclosed property for 50% of its appraised
value at the time of the loan. In July 2011, the percentage amount was increased to 60% and has since
then been raised to 70 percent. The EU has made additional interventions in this area. Since Aziz, the EU
adopted a Directive on February 4, 2014 on credit agreements relating to residential immovable property.
The fact that the EU is being proactive suggests that it recognizes the need to address in a uniform fashion
the inequities that consumers experience in mortgage loan contracts. Council Directive 2014/17/EU,
supra note 87, para. 34.
403. See European Banking Federation et al., European Agreement on a Voluntary Code of Conduct
on Pre-contractual Information for Home Loans: First Annual Progress Report on Implementation in the
European Union by 30th September 2002, at 3 (2002) (reporting “over 3600 credit institutions” in Europe
had registered with the Commission’s register).
404. Blanket resistance to deed in lieu deals has been shifting post-recession, as some banks have
agreed to this procedure. See Art Patnaude & David Román, Fall in Spain’s House Prices Steepens, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012. 6:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323981504
578179270357838436.
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well-being; banks rely upon housing as a profitmaking vehicle that structures
the lives of individuals without, at times, fully communicating associated
risks to borrowers.
VIII. PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDING HOUSING RIGHTS
The Great Recession teaches that homeownership, without more,
should not be the sole focal point of government development strategies.
Building affordable housing should be a critical element of governmental
policy. Governments should reallocate funds to enlarge the inventory of
public housing.405 Affordability should be measured in relationship to
income so that those falling within poverty and low-income categories are
able to secure housing. Spain should establish an affordable housing
network, a system by which individuals with housing needs are directed to
available apartments. Moreover, government should develop affordable
housing in urban centers and other places that are within close proximity to
employment opportunities, essential social resources, and infrastructure.
Having a sufficient supply of reasonably priced and government-funded
housing to accommodate the population is essential in economies where
there are low wages and high unemployment. Governments should design
programs to repurpose existing housing for rental purposes.406 Programs of
this type would work particularly well in economies in which the market is
saturated with vacant homes for purchase,407 and when the vacant housing is
centrally-located. In keeping with the mandates of the international human
right to housing, social policies should be formulated to subsidize individuals
for housing costs. Spain should also enlist the help of banks to create
alternative housing arrangements for foreclosed borrowers. However,
caution is necessary so that the alternatives do not ultimately prove to be
detrimental to housing consumers.408
405. Local government entities should be cautious about not giving too many incentives to
developers at the expense of the goal of serving the public interest.
406. This is one of the proposals advanced by Spain’s activists. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 6,
52.
407. See Abbey-Lambertz, supra note 45 (noting that there were three million unoccupied homes in
Spain in 2014); Guillem Fernandez Evangelista, Shrinking Social Housing Stocks as a Barrier to the
Eradication of Homelessness: The Cases of Germany, Finland, the United Kingdom and Spain, 10 EUR.
J. HOMELESSNESS 151, 167 (2016) (noting that a lack of resources limits even relatively comprehensive
housing programs); Edwards, supra note 43 (discussing efforts in Spain to use vacant homes to house
homeless citizens); see Keith, supra note 45 (discussing how only twenty percent of residential
apartments were sold in a complex with 13,500 units in the town of El Quiñón).
408. For example, rent-to-own contracts should not be structured in a predatory way which allows
banks to further harm defaulted borrowers who were subjected to the foreclosure process. Further, one of
history’s lessons is that, with rental rate freezes, Spain must monitor landlords so that they maintain their
buildings to meet habitable standards. Otherwise, it could result in a repeat of what happened when there
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Finally, Spain needs to further cultivate laws in the area of discharging
debts so that individuals will be able to fully re-engage in the socio-economy.
The human rights “fresh start” campaign is an affirmative step in this
direction.409 Housing counselors should be available to explain the meaning
of contract terms pertaining to housing; however, a counseling requirement
should never be allowed to substitute for fairness and good faith. In the realm
of mortgage lending, underwriting standards need to be strengthened. The
Bank of Spain, as the national oversight body, should perform its regulatory
role not only with an eye towards EU compliance, but with an appreciation
of the purpose of the consumer-oriented protections.410
IX. CONCLUSION
The early twenty-first century judicial and legislative reforms that have
played out on the canvas of Spain have international origins and significance.
Moreover, they can be construed in several ways. They signal a conceptual
change, an emergence of a protective regime focused on individuals,
families, and consumers. The global economic crisis brought attention to the
profound relationship between the rental housing market and lending
practices in the homeownership market. Governments and banks have the
power to influence economic wealth by manipulating housing markets.411 In
Spain, and other countries, the combination of easily accessible purchase
financing along with high demand and the insufficient supply of quality
affordable rental housing in the years preceding the Great Recession set the
conditions for economic exploitation. The case of Spain illustrates that
regulation of housing markets is necessary to even the playing field between
private actors, the populace, and their governments. Like any sovereign
nation, Spain is empowered to rethink its approach to markets without
prompting from the international community. The analysis herein, however,
chronicles a different path. It highlights Spain in dialogue with supranational
organs, private actors, and public activists in reimagining private law
contracts. The multi-dimensional reframing of housing is aimed at both
reallocating resources and power and achieving fairness in housing
transactions. While Spain is only one data point, the role of international
institutions in regulating housing markets supports the conclusion that the
was a rental freeze in the 1940s, which resulted in a proliferation of dilapidated uninhabitable housing.
See Cardesín, supra note 10, at 290.
409. See SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 68–69.
410. Spanish banks are subject to EU directives. See Fernando Mínguez & Miguel Sánchez Monjo,
Banking Regulation in Spain, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=b027178c-17ea-4b1f-9e76-1066e2d97f49.
411. See MBD, supra note 57, paras. 5.5, 12.4 (chiding Spain for feeding housing speculation rather
than addressing the needs of its populace).
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lessons are not confined to one country. Housing market rules are not
preordained. When markets fail to serve broad social goals, it is imperative
to rethink how they are structured and the relevant rules by which they
should abide. Shifts and reorientations can and should occur to address basic
human needs. With the appropriate rules, markets should be able to operate
without political disruptions that are inspired by intolerable conditions, such
as summary evictions, homelessness, and extreme socio-economic
inequality.412
This Article demonstrates the importance of public law to private law.
It illustrates how the various sectors of protest, private law, and public law
can intermingle, dynamically, to create change. Public activism informs both
private law and human rights actors about the needs and concerns of people.
Public protest exposes the neglect and detrimental actions of the government
and private entities. It amasses the evidence. It lays bare the pain inflicted.
Protest furnishes an agenda.413 Private law sets the parameters of the
agreements between lenders, borrowers, and guarantors, and between
landlords and tenants. It provides substance that informs the contractual
terms established. The rules of interaction are carved out. Courts may
interpret the terms and through international legal instruments, such as the
UCT Directive, evaluate whether they meet a minimum standard of fairness
and good faith. Human rights discourse focuses on the need to secure
resources and protections necessary to enhance the quality of life.
International human rights law, as exemplified by the ICESCR, has a stake
in rewriting mortgage and rental laws and, more broadly, in shaping housing
reforms. Human rights are not suspended merely because the matter
originates from private ordering arrangements.414 Whether human rights
principles are adhered to expressly in name, or whether they are adhered to
in spirit, the essential point is that courts, governing structures, and
businesses are cognizant of them and are compelled to act in accordance with
them, even if doing so is costly in the short-term.

412. As property scholar Joseph Singer posits: “Political theory supports the idea of creating a
democracy that respects fundamental human rights. This institutional setting forms the background within
which the market can operate, not the reverse.” Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property
Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1054 (2009); see also Suzanne Daley,
Foreclosure Protestors in Spain’s Cities Now Go Door to Door, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/europe/16spain.html (discussing Spanish protests of
foreclosures and government corruption); Daley, supra note 24 (examining the severity of personal
liability mortgages in Spain and their impact on individuals).
413. Through protest, PAH incentivized individuals to initiate claims against the states and against
financial institutions.
414. MBD, supra note 57.

